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The Use of Earnings and Operations Management to Avoid Credit Rating Downgrades 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Firms placed on negative credit watch face the threat of a credit rating downgrade. At the same 
time, they are given the opportunity to put recovery efforts in place to retain their current credit 
rating. In this paper, we test to what extent firms use earnings management as a short-term 
recovery strategy. We find that both accruals-based and real earnings management are associated 
with firms avoiding credit rating downgrades, and that these alternative earnings management 
strategies tend to be complements rather than substitutes. However, following the passage of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, only real earnings management is significantly associated with the credit 
watch outcome. We find evidence that firms which maintain their rating via earnings 
management are better able to afford the inevitable earnings reversals, and that in the year 
following the credit watch period the credit rating performance of these firms is significantly 
better than firms which undergo a downgrade, with fewer downgrades and more upgrades in this 
period. Our results also imply that credit rating agencies are not misled by earnings management 
but rather allow for some discretion in reporting earnings that facilitates the dissemination of 
private information about future firm performance.  
 
JEL classification: C25, G24, M41 
Keywords: Accruals-based earnings management, real earnings management, credit ratings, 
firm recovery, credit watch.  
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The Use of Earnings and Operations Management to Avoid Credit Rating Downgrades 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We examine the extent to which firms under immediate threat of a credit rating 
downgrade employ earnings management to demonstrate their recovery to the credit rating 
agencies (CRAs). The immediate threat of a rating downgrade occurs when the rating agencies 
announce a credit watch review period with negative implications. Credit ratings impact the cost 
of borrowing (Hand et al. 1992, Augustin et al. 2014) and are linked to investment regulations 
and thus institutional investors’ decisions about their investments (Kisgen 2006, White 2013, 
Alissa et al. 2013), and as such firms have strong incentives to maintain their credit rating. 
The credit watch period is a short acute period of financial fragility instigated by a third 
party which requires corporate managers to undertake immediate recovery efforts. The 
motivation for our analysis is to employ this unique setting to examine the influence of CRA 
monitoring on managerial behaviour. Managers are under external and highly visible pressure to 
act quickly to demonstrate recovery or recovery potential. Studies by Alissa et al. (2013) and 
Jung et al. (2013) suggest that firms manage earnings as part of their strategy for managing their 
credit rating, however these studies focus on endogenous firm incentives to manage earnings, 
rather than on the influence of rating agency monitoring.  
Firms are placed under negative credit watch when the CRA reviews a firm’s 
creditworthiness with a view to downgrading its current credit rating. At the same time, firms 
are given the opportunity to employ recovery strategies to convince the CRA that they are worthy 
of the existing credit rating (Boot et al. 2006). Recovery strategies of firms have been examined 
in relation to firms in financial distress (see, inter alia, Sudarsanam and Lai 2001), however many 
firms placed on a negative credit watch face short-term negative pressures in relation to their 
performance which may fall far short of financial distress, and the recovery strategies firms 
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employ in the short term have received limited attention. Earnings management offers a firm a 
means of improving performance in the very short term and the prior literature suggests that 
firms employ both accruals-based and real earnings management to achieve short-term 
improvements to reported financials (inter alia, Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al. 2008).1  
The theoretical underpinnings of this paper stem from the model developed by Boot et 
al. (2006), in which they show that firms put on a negative credit watch by CRAs have incentives 
to undertake recovery efforts to maintain their credit ratings. If the recovery efforts undertaken 
are successful the credit watch ends with a confirmation of the credit rating, whereas if the 
recovery efforts are inadequate the credit watch ends with a downgrade. We hypothesise that 
earnings management improves the likelihood that a firm will recover via a credit rating 
confirmation. Findings in support of our first hypothesis might suggest that the rating agencies 
are “fooled” by earnings management. However, in line with the arguments of DeFond and Park 
(1997), we conjecture that it is firms which are better able to withstand any earnings management 
reversals which are inclined to engage in earnings management, and that earnings management 
reversals notwithstanding, any earnings management during the credit watch period is not 
therefore associated with a worse performance, in terms of both accounting and credit rating, in 
the post-credit watch period. 
The findings of this paper suggest that earnings management strategies designed to 
improve short-term performance, but which may have a deleterious impact on longer-term 
performance, have an impact on a firm’s ability to recover and thereby retain its current credit 
rating. In turn, this is likely to impact a firm’s real cost of capital and the investment decisions 
of institutional investors. We find that the probability of firm recovery at the end of the credit 
watch period is a function of both accruals-based and real earnings management during the credit 
                                                          
1 There is a growing body of literature suggesting that firms use both real and accruals-based earnings management 
to achieve certain corporate goals. For example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2016) confirm that 
firms engage in both real and accruals earnings management around seasoned equity offerings. 
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watch period. We find that real and accruals-based earnings management tend to be complements 
rather than substitutes and we suggest that conditional on the decision to engage in earnings 
management, the reasons for employing both real and accruals-based earnings management may 
be due to the lack of forewarning of the need to take immediate action to avoid the negative 
consequences of a rating downgrade. However, we find that the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act (SOX) on August 29, 2002 led to a shift in the CRAs’ treatment of earnings management 
strategies, with only real earnings management being significantly associated with the credit 
watch outcome post SOX. We argue that this is in line with Dimitrov et al. (2015), who show 
that an increase in regulatory scrutiny causes the CRAs to become more conservative. 
Commensurate with earnings management reversals, we find that the accounting 
performance of confirmed firms deteriorates in the first year after the conclusion of the credit 
watch period, whereas the accounting performance of downgraded firms remains the same. 
However, despite the earnings management reversals the accounting performance of firms with 
confirmed ratings is not less than that of downgraded firms one year after the end of the credit 
watch, suggesting that confirmed firms can better afford the earnings reversal. The credit rating 
performance of confirmed firms is significantly better than downgraded firms in the year 
following the credit watch, with fewer downgrades and more upgrades in this period. This 
suggests that where firms can afford the inevitable earnings reversal it benefits them to engage 
in earnings management to maintain their rating, since the rating is likely to be maintained in the 
longer term as well. DeFond and Park (1997) argue that where firms predict a reversal in their 
performance decline they are able and willing to “borrow” earnings from the future. We 
conjecture that CRAs treat the earnings management undertaken by firms which have their rating 
confirmed as a means of facilitating the dissemination of private information about the future 
performance of the firm.  
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In our analysis, we take account of the current debate in the literature about the validity 
of measures of accruals-based earnings management given the impact of changes in the operating 
environment on accruals, which is especially important in studies such as ours, which relate to 
the impact of exogenous events on earnings management. Our paper considers not just the 
instigation of the credit watch, but also its removal, and it is the existence of these two break 
points which enables us to be more confident that we identify discretionary earnings management 
associated with the credit watch. Nonetheless, we also undertake a supporting analysis in which 
we directly account for the fact that our measure of discretionary accruals might in part reflect 
firm idiosyncratic shocks, as suggested by Owens et al. (2017). We find that incorporating 
idiosyncratic shocks into our measure of discretionary accruals does not alter our results and 
further corroborates the association between income increasing earnings management and the 
likelihood of a credit rating confirmation. 
We undertake a number of other supplementary sensitivity tests including examining the 
impact of the length of the credit watch period. The length of the credit watch period does not 
materially affect the employment of earnings management as a recovery strategy and we argue 
that firms are motivated to engage in earnings management even where the credit watch turns 
out to be short.2  
Our results contribute to the prior literature by showing that monitoring by the rating 
agencies induces firms to engage in earnings management as a recovery tool, and we demonstrate 
the important role of real earnings management in avoiding a credit rating downgrade once a 
firm is placed on a credit watch with negative implications, which is over and above the impact 
of accruals-based earnings management. We also show that both real and accruals-based 
                                                          
2 Ex ante a firm does not know how long the credit watch period will last and thus would be incentivised to start 
earnings management on announcement of the credit watch (earnings management would on average be unlikely to 
completely reverse in the very short term such that both earnings management and its reversal occur within one 
quarterly period). Further, while quarterly is the greatest frequency with which data are available to us, firms are 
not restricted to quarterly intervals in passing information to the rating agencies. Quarterly figures will reflect ex 
post what has happened on a more frequent basis during the credit watch period. 
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earnings management are employed in a complementary manner when the need to take action is 
both urgent and comes without forewarning.  
A contemporaneous paper by Liu et al. (2017) provides independent evidence that firms 
which engage in earnings management successfully defend their credit rating at the conclusion 
of the credit watch review process. Their analysis focuses solely on accruals-based earnings 
management and we consider the additional importance of real earnings management and the 
interaction between accruals-based and real earnings management, which includes an analysis 
of the impact of SOX on the choice of earnings management strategy. We also add to the findings 
of Liu et al. by examining credit rating agency actions up to one year after the end of the credit 
watch period.3 Caton et al. (2011) argue that where earnings management is employed to fool 
rating agencies this will inevitably result in more downgrades for firms which manage earnings 
once earnings management reverses. Liu et al. conclude that the deterioration in the accounting 
performance which follows higher levels of earnings management suggests that such earnings 
management is opportunistic, with the rating agencies either unwilling or unable to commit 
resources to discover earnings management.4,5 By contrast, we argue that the fact that the rating 
agencies are not forced to reverse (i.e. downgrade) their positive response to earnings 
management (i.e. a rating confirmation) in the longer term suggests that earnings management 
provides the rating agencies with useful information. This suggestion is in line with recent 
evidence by Kraft (2015) which implies that the CRAs are sophisticated users of financial 
reporting information, as well as DeFond and Park (1997) who suggest that firms which expect 
                                                          
3 Our paper consists of 1,229 Standard & Poor’s credit watches from 1989 to 2011, whereas the sample in Liu et 
al. (2017) consists of 458 Moody’s credit watches from 1992 to 2006. We also extend their analysis in a number 
of supplementary tests (see Section 7 for details). Inter alia, we employ the accruals-based earnings management 
model of Owens et al. (2017) to account for possible business model shocks as a driver of abnormal accruals, and 
we analyse the impact of the length of the credit watch period and contemporaneous Moody’s credit watches. 
4 An alternative explanation suggested by Liu et al. (2017) is that earnings management is condoned by the rating 
agencies for agency or contractual reasons. 
5 In untabulated analysis we replicated the results of Liu et al. (2017) based on credit watches in a common sample 
period (1992-2006). Our findings do not change when we restrict the sample to this period and confirmed firms still 
undergo a better future rating performance. 
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poor current earnings to be followed by better future earnings elect to “borrow” earnings from 
the future. 
Alissa et al. (2013) argue that companies use income increasing (decreasing) earnings 
management to achieve a target credit rating when their true credit rating is below (above) their 
target rating, but unlike our study the decision to engage in earnings management is 
endogenously determined under the assumption that a firm employs the model of Alissa et al. 
(2013) to determine under- or over-valuation of the rating. We assume that the decision to engage 
in earnings management is exogenously triggered by a credit watch action of a rating agency 
which indicates a potential over-valuation of the current rating and motivates a firm to take 
immediate action. Jung et al. (2013) also examine the link between accounting earnings and 
credit ratings and employ the assumption that firms near rating band boundaries engage in 
income smoothing in an attempt to gain upgrades or avoid downgrades. They only find support 
for the use of income smoothing to gain upgrades and suggest that this results from greater 
scrutiny of firms near to the downgrade boundary and/or earnings smoothing being an 
unimportant criterion for downgrades (but not upgrades). By contrast, we find that firms 
successfully engage in earnings management to avoid credit rating downgrades.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; in Section 2 we describe the rating process 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 focuses on sample selection and data collection 
processes. We present our empirical results in Sections 4 through 7, and Section 8 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Institutional Setting and Hypotheses 
 
We commence this section by providing details of the credit ratings process to establish 
that accounting earnings are important inputs into the ratings process. This is a prerequisite for 
earnings management to be a potential determinant of credit rating outcomes. We then discuss 
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earnings management within the context of credit watch periods, from which we develop our 
hypotheses.  
Since we employ a sample of Standard and Poor’s credit watches, we examine the 
corporate ratings criteria published by Standard and Poor’s in 2008 and 2013, with this latter 
document undergoing a revision in 2017. For each rated entity, Standard and Poor’s establish 
both a business risk profile and a financial risk profile which feed into a credit rating “anchor” 
which is then subject to various modifiers. The business risk profile essentially captures the risks 
and rewards associated with the environment in which the firm operates (including country and 
industry risks). The financial risk profile is associated with the risks derived from a firm level 
analysis, including an assessment of the firm’s management. Whilst a framework exists for the 
assessment of each rated entity, the financial and business risk profiles rely on both quantitative 
and qualitative assessments.  
Kraft (2015) argues that accounting numbers are important inputs into the rating process 
and Standard and Poor’s underline this by stating in their 2008 document “A company’s financial 
reports are the starting point for the financial analysis of a rated entity (or issue).” Begley (2015) 
identifies Debt/EBITDA as Standard and Poor’s key ratio for the purpose of the financial analysis 
(see also Standard and Poor’s (2013a) 6 ), and thus reported earnings are the basis for the 
denominator of this core ratio. The prior literature establishes that reported earnings are a primary 
accounting number for the purpose of credit ratings by showing that firms attempt to manipulate 
reported earnings to influence their credit rating. Alissa et al. (2013) argue that companies use 
income increasing (decreasing) earnings management to achieve a target credit rating when their 
true credit rating is below (above) their target rating. Jung et al. (2013) find evidence to suggest 
                                                          
6 In fact, Standard and Poor’s (2013a) establish two “core ratios”, Funds from Operations (FFO) to Debt and Debt 
to EBITDA; however, S&P derive FFO from adjustments to EBITDA. Standard and Poor’s (2013b) details the 
calculation of these core ratios. Specifically, “Our definition of FFO is EBITDA minus net interest expense minus 
current tax expense, after adjusting each of the three components according to our criteria”. For the sake of clarity, 
we confirm that the three components referred to by S&P are EBITDA, interest expense and current tax expense.  
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that firms engage in income smoothing to gain rating upgrades. Begley (2015) demonstrates that 
firms attempt to manipulate EBITDA (to affect the value of their Debt/EBITDA ratio) to 
influence their credit rating, even where the cost of doing so is to engage in behaviour which 
might destroy firm value in the longer term. 
Having established that accounting earnings are an important input into the ratings 
process, it is important that we consider rating agencies’ adjustments to reported earnings.  Any 
adjustment to reported earnings by the rating agencies is likely to mitigate the incentive to 
manage earnings. Alissa et al. (2013) argue that CRAs take financial statements at face value, 
suggesting either no or limited adjustments are made to the reported accounting numbers. Kraft 
(2015) argues, however, that accounting numbers do not enter the ratings process in their “raw” 
form. She investigates the precise nature of the adjustments made by Moody’s ratings agency to 
reported financials. She provides evidence that the primary adjustments reflect increases in debt 
obligations to reflect off-balance sheet financing with the effect that leverage ratios significantly 
increase from those based on GAAP reported figures. However, Kraft finds that changes to 
reported earnings are minimal.7 We suggest that the size of the adjustment to reported earnings 
means that the reduction in incentive to manage earnings is small. This is again borne out by the 
prior literature cited above, which confirms that firms manage their earnings to influence their 
credit rating.  
The credit rating of a firm is placed on credit watch when short-term events indicate that 
a change in the rating may be due. Boot et al. (2006) argue that where a firm is under review for 
a rating downgrade, the firm has the opportunity to put in a recovery effort. At the end of the 
credit watch period the rating agency either amends (upgrade/downgrade) or confirms the current 
rating (rating confirmation); typically, the direction of any rating change follows the direction of 
                                                          
7 Thus, the ratio of total debt to total assets increases on average by 70% with a median change of 20%, whereas 
adjustments to reported profits result in changes to the median return on assets (operating margin) of “only” (page 
652) -2% (+3.4%). 
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the indicated review process, i.e. downgrades (upgrades) follow negative (positive) credit watch 
periods. The most likely outcome of a negative credit watch period is a rating downgrade; 
however, a significant minority of ratings are confirmed (38% in this study). Negative credit 
watch periods are more common and are the focus of our analysis.8  
The credit watch period is typically short; the median duration across our sample is 78 
trading days and this provides a unique and clearly defined setting in which to investigate 
managerial behaviour. Firms are under external and highly visible pressure to act quickly to 
demonstrate recovery or recovery potential. Both accruals and real earnings management offer 
firms a means of improving performance in the short term. Accruals-based earnings management 
has been employed by firms, inter alia, to mislead users of financial reports (Fields et al. 2001), 
to increase government support (Jones 1991), to inflate earnings before seasoned bond offerings 
(Caton et al. 2011) and, as reported above, to achieve target credit ratings (Alissa et al. 2013). 
The aim of accruals-based earnings management in the face of a downgrade threat would be to 
manage earnings upwards via changes in the discretionary portion of accruals. Discretionary 
accruals are the portion of accruals which are not explained by the economic circumstances of 
the firm (Jones 1991). Larger net discretionary accrued income results in higher earnings. 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence of the management of operational activities (real 
earnings management) for achieving short-term improvements in reported results, with firms 
engaging in price discounting, overproduction and a reduction in discretionary expenditures. 
Roychowdury (2006) argues that each of these strategies is associated with expected changes to 
financial reports; for example, abnormally high production costs relative to sales are suggestive 
of cash discounts to boost sales, abnormally low cash flows would be expected where firms offer 
better credit terms to boost sales and abnormally high production costs (in manufacturing firms) 
                                                          
8 Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) report that only 15% of the bonds in their sample were under review for 
an upgrade, with 85% under review for a downgrade. 
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would be expected where these firms produce more goods than necessary to meet expected 
demand with the aim of reducing the cost of goods sold by spreading fixed costs across more 
units. 
To summarise to this point, we argue that earnings management is commonly employed 
by firms to improve their reported accounting performance, that accounting earnings are 
important inputs into the ratings process, that rating agencies’ adjustments to reported earnings 
are small and that earnings management can be successfully employed to influence credit rating 
outcomes. We argue that firms put on credit watch with negative implications have an incentive 
to manage their earnings in an attempt to protect their credit rating from a downgrade. The above 
arguments lead to our first hypothesis: 
 
 H1: Earnings management improves the likelihood that a firm will avoid a rating downgrade at 
the end of a credit watch review period with negative implications. 
 
Earnings management is often associated with lower quality earnings (inter alia, Ali and 
Zhang 2015) and CRAs have strong incentives to protect their reputation (inter alia, Dimitrov et 
al. 2015) by discounting any attempt to fool them. An alternative hypothesis is that the CRAs 
appropriately adjust for any detected earnings management such that credit watch outcomes are 
not related to earnings management. To enable CRAs to discount earnings management we rely 
on the assumption that CRAs are sophisticated users of financial statements (e.g. Kraft 2015) 
and during the credit watch process are in a position to demand information from the firm’s 
managers (Boot et al. 2006). 
Nevertheless, even sophisticated users can make errors in analysing financial statements 
and unravelling earnings management is costly. Liu et al. (2017) argue that even following 
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Regulation Fair Disclosure,9 the CRAs lack full access to internal records which may be required 
to identify earnings management. Findings in support of our first hypothesis might suggest that 
the rating agencies make errors. In this case, as argued by Caton et al. (2011), we expect that 
when the CRAs become aware of their error (as earnings management reverses), the rating 
agencies will be forced to downgrade the ratings of firms which were confirmed at the end of the 
credit watch period.  
It is also possible that CRAs allow for managerial discretion to encourage the 
dissemination of private information. DeFond and Park (1997) suggest that firms which expect 
poor current earnings to be followed by better future earnings elect to “borrow” earnings from 
the future. We formulate our second hypothesis in line with the arguments of DeFond and Park 
(1997) and we conjecture that it is firms which are better able to withstand any earnings 
management reversals which are inclined to engage in earnings management. As such, earnings 
management reversals notwithstanding, any earnings management during the credit watch period 
is not associated with a worse performance, in terms of both accounting and credit rating, in the 
post credit watch period. Our second hypothesis is:  
 
H2: Firms which engage in earnings management during the credit watch review period are 
those which can afford to do so, and they do not have a worse accounting and credit rating 
performance in the post credit watch review period.  
 
Our two hypotheses require us to discount the possibility that earnings management is 
itself a by-product of future profitability, which is then reflected in better credit rating outcomes, 
an issue we discuss further at the end of Section 3.3 and Section 4.1.  
 
                                                          
9 Implemented on 23rd October 2000. 
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3. Data 
3.1.Sample 
We focus on negative credit watches issued by Standard and Poor’s to firms listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for the period 1989 through 2011. We exclude financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000 through 6999) since firm recovery variables are unlikely to be comparable with other 
sectors. Where a firm’s rating is placed on negative credit watch owing to a merger or acquisition 
(M&A) the recovery effort may be affected by other factors related to the merger/acquisition. 
For this reason, we exclude all credit watch announcements related to mergers and acquisitions. 
After exclusion of financial firms and M&A related credit watch announcements we have 
a sample of 2,076 negative credit watch events. From this universe of credit watch events, 
earnings management data are available for 1,229 events, which form the sample for our paper. 
Of the 1,229 credit watches 471 (38%) end in a confirmation of the previous rating and 758 
(62%) end in a downgrade. In Table 1 we present basic descriptive statistics for our credit watch 
sample and show that the sample we employ does not differ materially from the universe of credit 
watch announcements. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Credit watch periods vary in length across our sample; 10% are of one-month duration 
(21 trading days) or less and 10% are greater than 12 months duration. We support our analysis 
across the full sample with an analysis on longer and shorter credit watch periods separately. 
 We examine each event in our sample from the last quarterly accounts prior to the start 
of the credit watch period to the first quarterly accounts after the end of the credit watch period. 
This period of analysis fully captures any changes during the entire length of the credit watch 
period. We repeat all our analyses using data from the last quarterly accounts prior to the start of 
the credit watch period to the last quarterly accounts before the end of the credit watch period 
and find that our conclusions do not differ. These results are available from the authors on 
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request. Changes for each quarter are calculated with respect to the same quarter of the previous 
year. The accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management variables 
represent the average quarterly figure for the credit watch period, measured on an arithmetic 
basis.  
 
3.2. Accruals-based Earnings Management  
Firms might increase their earnings by increasing the amount of net discretionary accrued 
income. To calculate abnormal discretionary accruals, we compare the discretionary accruals of 
our sample firms with the discretionary accruals which would be predicted employing data for 
similar firms in the same time period. 
We employ the model of Jones (1991) modified for the impact of performance (return on 
assets (ROA)) and the use of quarterly data (Kothari et al. 2005, Louis et al. 2008). We divide 
all firms in the Compustat database into portfolios for each quarter based on 2-digit SIC industry 
codes. We run the following regression on total accruals for each quarter and each 2-digit SIC 
industry portfolio:  
 
TAjt = α+ β1Q1jt + β2Q2jt + β3Q3jt + β4ΔSALESjt + β5PPEGTjt +εjt (1) 
 
Where, TA is total accruals for firm j for each quarter t, the change in noncash current assets less 
the change in current liabilities plus the change in debt in current liabilities minus depreciation 
(∆ Compustat 40 - ∆ Compustat 36 - ∆ Compustat 49 + ∆ Compustat 45 – Compustat 5). ΔSALES 
is the change in sales from the same quarter in the previous year to the current quarter. PPEGT 
is the gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat 118). Q1 to Q3 are the dummy variables 
indicating the fiscal quarter. As is standard practice, all variables, including the constant, are 
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scaled by total assets (Compustat 44) to reduce heteroscedasticity. Following Louis et al. (2008), 
the minimum number of observations for each industry-quarter is 20.  
The regression coefficients are then employed to determine the portion of accruals in the 
credit watch period, which is discretionary. For each quarter, the level of discretionary accruals 
is given by: 
 
DISC_ACCjt = TAjt – (?̂?+ 𝛽1̂Q1jt + 𝛽2̂Q2jt + 𝛽3̂Q3jt + 𝛽4̂ΔSALESjt + 𝛽5̂PPEGTjt) (2) 
 
The regression coefficients for the appropriate industry and quarter are used to calculate 
discretionary accruals in the credit watch window for each sample firm for each quarter in the 
credit watch period. To allow for the impact of performance on discretionary accruals we follow 
Louis et al. (2008) and we now divide all the firms in the Compustat database into portfolios 
based on ROA quintiles in addition to 2-digit SIC industry codes and quarter. We then calculate 
the level of discretionary accruals for each industry/ROA portfolio for each quarter again 
employing the regression coefficients for the appropriate industry and quarter. The performance 
adjusted abnormal accrual, Adj_ABACC, equals the discretionary accruals of the firm minus the 
average discretionary accrual of the industry/ROA/quarter matched portfolio. 
There is a debate in the literature about the suitability of the measures of accruals-based 
earnings management currently employed, however no consensus has been reached about a 
suitable alternative (see, for example, Ball 2013, Owens et al. 2017). Further, some of the novel 
approaches suggested are largely untested and may exacerbate measurement errors for some 
firms in ways which are neither readily apparent nor understood. Our primary results are based 
on up-to-date versions of conventional models that are widely used in the most recent studies 
published (inter alia, Ali and Zheng 2015, Bratten et al. 2016, Louis and Sun 2016, Kothari et al. 
2016, Vansant 2016). Owens et al. (2017) argue that the performance adjusted measure of 
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abnormal accruals of Kothari et al. (2005) does not go far enough to address the problem of the 
impact of performance on the measurement of discretionary accruals and in Section 6.1 we repeat 
our analyses following the approach of Owens et al. (2017), which allows for the impact of 
idiosyncratic shocks on the accruals generating process. We provide further discussion of the 
impact of performance on measured earnings management at the end of Section 3.3 on real 
earnings management. 
Debt/EBITDA is a core ratio used by S&P to assess the financial profile of each issuer 
(Begley 2015) and since this ratio is impacted by current rather than total accruals, we repeat our 
analyses employing current accruals in place of total accruals. The results do not differ materially 
from those employing total accruals and full details are available from the authors upon request.  
 
3.3. Real Earnings Management  
Firms might improve their reported performance in the near term by real earnings 
management (real activities manipulation) defined by Roychowdhury (2006) as “departures from 
normal operating practices” (page 337). Following Roychowdhury (2006), we employ abnormal 
cashflows, production expenses and discretionary expenses as measures of real earnings 
management. Following on from our arguments in Section 2, firms which engage in real earnings 
management would be associated with abnormally high levels of production costs relative to 
sales (the result of sales boosted by cash discounts and/or, in the case of manufacturing firms, 
overproduction10), abnormally low cash flows relative to sales (sales boosted via favourable 
credit terms) and abnormally low levels of discretionary expenses (earnings boosted by a 
reduction in expenses). Favourable credit terms and a reduction in discretionary expenses have 
opposing effects on cashflows and thus where a firm offers favourable credit terms and reduces 
expenses, we may not see abnormally low levels of cashflows. 
                                                          
10 For further details, see also Section 7, where we specifically consider overproduction by manufacturing firms. 
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To calculate abnormal real earnings management, we compare our sample firms with 
similar firms in the same time period. We divide all firms in the Compustat database into 
portfolios for each quarter based on 2-digit SIC industry codes. To calculate abnormal cash 
flows, production costs and discretionary expenses, we first estimate normal figures for each 
industry (2-digit SIC) in each quarter: 
 
CFOjt= α1+ α2+ β1Q1 + β2Q2 + β3Q3 + β4 SALESjt+ β5 ΔSALESjt + εjt (3) 
PRODjt = α1+ α2+ β1Q1 + β2Q2 + β3Q3 + β4 SALESjt + β5 ΔSALESjt + β6 ΔSALESjt-4 + εjt  (4) 
EXPjt = α1+ α2+ β1Q1 + β2Q2 + β3Q3 + β4 SALESjt + εjt  (5) 
 
CFO is the operating cash flow (Compustat 10811) for firm j at the end of the quarter t; PROD is 
the quarterly production costs, given by the cost of goods sold (Compustat 30) plus the change 
in inventory (Compustat 38). EXP is the quarterly discretionary expenses, the sum of selling, 
general and administrative expenses (Compustat 1), and research and development expenses 
(Compustat 4).12 SALES is sales (Compustat 2) in quarter t. ΔSALES is the difference between 
sales in the current quarter t and sales in the same quarter of the previous year. The first constant 
term, α1, is an unscaled intercept used by Roychowdhury to ensure the mean abnormal figure for 
every industry-year is zero. All other variables are scaled by total assets (Compustat 44) to reduce 
heteroscedasticity and thus the second intercept α2 is the inverse of total assets. Q1 to Q3 are the 
dummy variables indicating the fiscal quarter, and scaled by total assets. Again, the minimum 
number of observations for each industry-quarter is 20.  
                                                          
11 The operating cash flow is a year-to-date item and for quarters two through four we calculate the quarterly 
operating cash flow by subtracting operating cash flow in the previous quarter. 
12 This variable is only available where research and development expenses are available in the Compustat 
database. We do not set missing values to zero. 
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The estimated intercepts and coefficients from the portfolio estimations are employed to 
calculate the abnormal cash flow, production costs and discretionary expenses for each firm as 
follows:  
 
ABCFOjt = CFOjt – (𝛼1̂+ 𝛼2̂ + 𝛽1̂Q1jt + 𝛽2̂Q2jt + 𝛽3̂Q3jt + 𝛽4̂SALESjt + 𝛽5̂ ΔSALESjt) (6) 
ABPRODjt = PRODjt – (𝛼1̂+ 𝛼2̂ + 𝛽1̂Q1jt + 𝛽2̂Q2jt + 𝛽3̂Q3jt + 𝛽4̂SALESjt + 
+ 𝛽4̂SALESjt + 𝛽5̂ ΔSALESjt+ 𝛽6̂ ΔSALESjt-4) (7) 
ABEXPjt = EXPjt – (𝛼1̂+ 𝛼2̂+ 𝛽1̂Q1jt + 𝛽2̂Q2jt + 𝛽3̂Q3jt + 𝛽4̂SALESjt) (8) 
 
Alissa et al. (2013) allow for the impact of performance on real earnings management 
and, as with the method set out in Section 3.2, we divide all firms in the Compustat database into 
portfolios based on ROA quintiles in addition to 2-digit SIC industry codes and quarter. We then 
calculate the level of real earnings management for each industry/ROA portfolio for each quarter 
employing the regression coefficients for the appropriate industry and quarter. The performance 
adjusted real earnings management variables, Adj_ABCFO, Adj_ABPROD, Adj_ABEXP, equal 
the real earnings management of the firm minus the average real earnings management of the 
industry/ROA/quarter matched portfolio. 
We also construct a comprehensive measure of real earnings management, Adj_REM1, 
as suggested by Cohen et al. (2008). Adj_REM1 equals minus one times Adj_ABCFO plus 
Adj_ABPROD. This measure shows how firms use both abnormal cash flow and abnormal 
production costs to manage reported performance. As argued above, favourable credit terms and 
a reduction in discretionary expenses have opposing effects on cashflows and we therefore 
employ a second comprehensive measure of real earnings management which excludes 
cashflows, Adj_REM2, calculated as Adj_ABPROD less Adj_ABEXP.   
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The measures of real earnings management are also subject to criticism – a deterioration 
in credit quality (as indicated by a credit watch with negative implications) might cause changes 
in firm strategies and/or performance which are reflected in measured (real or accruals-based) 
discretionary earnings management but which do not in fact result solely from managerial 
discretion. In part, this is mitigated by the fact that we show that earnings management is 
associated with the credit watch period and not the periods before and after the credit watch. 
However, since the turning point may be caused by a change in performance as a firm first 
deteriorates and then recovers we acknowledge that our results are predicated on the extent to 
which our empirical proxies truly capture discretionary earnings management, and are thus at 
best a joint test of both the adequacy of the proxies we employ and our hypotheses. 
 
3.4. Firm Characteristics Associated with Recovery 
We employ control variables to represent the likelihood of recovery owing to firm 
characteristics. Table 1 suggests that the probability of recovery is related to the initial credit 
quality. The approximate chance of recovery is 12% for firms with an AAA rating, 34% for firms 
with a BBB rating and about 50% for firms with a B rating or below. Prima facie, it is surprising 
that the chance of recovery declines with increasing credit quality; for example, it might be 
expected that firms at the investment rating threshold (BBB rating) would have the highest 
incentive to put in a recovery effort. Boot et al. (2006) argue that the likelihood of a firm being 
put on credit watch is a function of the firm’s credit quality and those of low credit quality would 
usually be downgraded directly and thus only those firms with a higher than average chance of 
recovery for that rating category are put on credit watch. Chung et al. (2012) also report that a 
negative credit watch is less likely to lead to a downgrade for firms with low credit quality and 
suggest that lower credit quality firms have a higher incentive to recover. The credit rating of the 
firm is thus a key recovery potential variable.  
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To assess the impact of firm strategies on the probability of recovery, we control for the 
firm characteristics which Boot et al. (2006) suggest determine the likelihood that a recovery 
effort will be successful. Less flexible firms will not be able to recover as readily and our first 
set of variables relates to the flexibility of the firm. Anderson et al. (2003) argue that sales, 
general and administrative (SGA) expenses are sticky, i.e. when sales decline, SGA expenses 
cannot be reduced at the same pace and thus firms with higher SGA in their cost structure are 
less likely to recover (expected sign is negative). Our second measure of flexibility is plant, 
property and equipment (PPE) as a proportion of total assets. Where total assets consist of a high 
proportion of fixed assets we assume that the firm is less flexible and thus less likely to recover 
quickly (expected sign is negative). Where firms have a high level of debt financing, with its 
implicit fixed cost in the form of promised interest payments, it is assumed to be less flexible. 
We employ the interest cover ratio (expected sign is positive), with the latter giving an indication 
of how comfortably the firm is able to meet its current interest payments from current profits.13 
Firm size (variable = Size) is positively correlated with credit ratings across our sample (the two 
have a positive correlation of 0.51); however, we hypothesise that large firms have access to 
greater resources to aid recovery (expected sign is positive). Boot et al. also suggest that recovery 
potential will depend on the type of activity in which the firm is involved and we employ sector 
dummy variables to capture variations in recovery potential across sectors. The chances of 
recovery are likely to be higher when other firms are also doing well and thus we control for 
general economic circumstances via the variable Recession. This is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of 1 if the month of credit watch announcement is defined as recession by the U.S. 
Federal Reserve (expected sign is negative).  
                                                          
13 Financial gearing might also indicate financial flexibility but given its high correlation with both firm size and 
interest cover, we employ interest cover. 
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We also employ the length of the credit watch (Length) as a control variable. Bannier and 
Hirsch (2010) report that larger firms have shorter credit watch reviews, consistent with their 
ability to comply quickly with the rating agency demands. However, our regression results 
indicate that while larger firms are more likely to recover, the length of the credit watch has a 
(small) positive impact on recovery chances. Chung et al. (2012) report that CRAs, on average, 
take longer to assess recovery than to assess a downgrade.  
Definitions of the variables employed in our models are in Table 2. All variables employ 
the latest data at the start of the credit watch period and accounting variables are winsorized at 
the 1% level.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
4. The Impact of Earnings Management on Recovery 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
In Table 3 we compare our key variables across firms which were downgraded at the end 
of the credit watch period and firms which had their rating confirmed and therefore made a 
successful recovery. In addition, we also show statistics for pre- and post-credit watch periods 
and test whether firms’ earnings management practices are triggered by the credit watch. The 
lengths of the pre- and post-credit watch periods we examine are equal to the length of the credit 
watch period for each firm.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Firms with a rating confirmation (successful recovery) have significantly positive mean 
and median abnormal net accrued discretionary earnings (average per period) during the credit 
watch, whereas downgraded firms do not; the mean and median values of abnormal net accrued 
discretionary earnings are significantly larger for firms with rating confirmations than for 
downgraded firms. We predicted via our first hypothesis that firms would signal their likelihood 
of recovery via managing their earnings upwards during the credit watch period and the data in 
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Table 3 suggest that firms which make a successful recovery indeed improve their accounting 
results during the credit watch period (relative to the periods before and after the credit watch 
period) via increases in net accrued discretionary earnings. Our findings employing current 
accruals in place of total accruals do not alter these conclusions. 
Firms which attempt to improve their performance via real earnings management would 
be associated with abnormally high levels of production costs relative to sales as a result of sales 
boosted by cash discounts. Table 3 shows that firms with a rating confirmation (successful 
recovery) have significantly positive mean and median abnormal production costs (average per 
period) during the credit watch, whereas downgraded firms do not, and both mean and median 
values are significantly larger for firms with rating confirmations than for firms with rating 
downgrades. For confirmed firms (but not downgraded firms) the production costs are 
significantly higher during the credit watch period relative to the periods before and after the 
credit watch period. 
Firms which attempt to improve their performance may also have abnormally low cash 
flows relative to sales as a result of sales being boosted via favourable credit terms. However, 
reducing discretionary expenses would increase cashflows. Thus, two earnings management 
strategies, i.e. favourable credit terms and a reduction in discretionary expenses, have opposing 
effects on cashflows. Data on discretionary expenses are only available for 453 out of 1,229 
credit watches, and we have pre- and post-credit watch data for 302 of these 453. Based on this 
sub-sample we show that both confirmed (successful recovery) and downgraded firms have 
abnormally low levels of discretionary expenses during the credit watch period, however only 
downgraded firms have discretionary expenses which are significantly lower during the credit 
watch period than in the pre and post credit watch periods. Where discretionary expenses are 
abnormally low we expect cashflows to be abnormally high and we find that downgraded firms 
have significantly positive cashflows in the credit watch period, but not confirmed firms. This 
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suggests that confirmed firms may engage in both the reduction of discretionary expenses and 
improving credit terms to boost sales. We predicted via our first hypothesis that firms would also 
improve their likelihood of recovery by real earnings management to boost reported figures 
during credit watch periods and the data in Table 3 suggest that this is the case.  
The composite real earnings management measures reflect the underlying inputs, and 
there is therefore little to add to the above discussions. Adj_REM1 is dominated by abnormally 
high levels of production costs relative to sales for confirmed firms. However, the results for 
Adj_REM2 suggest that for the sub-sample of firms with available expenses data, cost-cutting 
dominates price discounts and/or overproduction as a means of recovery.  
Finally, we find that earnings management is specifically associated with the credit watch 
period, not before and not after. We conclude that the earnings management measures are not a 
by-product of future improvements in profitability, since earnings management does not 
continue into the post credit watch period for confirmed firms. In Section 5 we show that earnings 
management reverses in the post-credit watch period, which suggests that earnings management 
arises as a deliberate strategy during the credit watch period.  
 
4.2. Regression Analysis  
We now test the impact of our earnings management variables on firm recovery in the 
presence of firm characteristics which would be likely to impact the chance of recovery. We 
employ logistic regression models where our dependent variable takes a value of 1 where a firm 
recovers at the end of the credit watch period (Confirm = 1) and a value of 0 where a firm is 
downgraded (DG = 0). “FirmActions” in Equation 9 below relates to our earnings management 
variables (Adj_ABACC, Adj_ABCFO, Adj_ABPROD, Adj_EXP, Adj_REM1 and 2).  
 
Logit (=1 Confirm; =0 DG) = Constant + β1 Firm Actions + β2 RATING + 
+ β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE + β6 SGA +  
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+ β7 SIZE + β8 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies (9) 
 
The results of running Equation 9 across our sample firms are shown in Table 4. The 
results in Table 4 relate to the entire span of the credit watch period, from the last accounts prior 
to the start to the first accounts following the end.14 Since some firms contribute more than one 
observation to our sample we control for clustering at the firm level. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
We find that the likelihood that a firm will recover is significantly related to higher levels 
of abnormal accrued earnings, lower levels of abnormal cashflows and higher levels of abnormal 
production expenses.15 Adj_REM1 is a composite measure of real activities management which 
takes account of the joint impact of abnormal cashflows and production expenses and an increase 
in this measure of abnormal real earnings increases the probability of recovery. These findings 
support H1, that firms’ earnings management activities predict the likelihood of successful 
recovery.16 
We do not find a relationship between the recovery probability and abnormal 
discretionary expenses, nor our alternative composite measure of real earnings management 
(Adj_REM2), which incorporates abnormal discretionary expenses. This is in line with the results 
in Table 3, where we report no statistical difference between abnormal expenses during the credit 
watch relative to the pre- and post-credit watch period for firms with a confirmed rating. We 
previously highlighted the opposing impact of discretionary accruals and favourable credit terms 
on abnormal cashflows; while lower than expected discretionary expenses do not impact the 
                                                          
14 Results for firms examined from the last accounts before the start of the credit watch to the last accounts before 
the end of the credit watch confirm those in Table 4 and are available from the authors upon request. 
15 Employing current rather than total accruals does not change any of our conclusions. The results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
16 We do not infer the economic magnitude of the impact of earnings management since the magnitude of measured 
earnings management does not translate into a dollar amount being manipulated. We nonetheless present marginal 
effects in Table 4, which are roughly equal to the instantaneous change in probability of recovery associated with a 
one standard deviation increase from the sample mean in the variable of interest holding all dummy variables at 
zero and all other variables at their mean.    
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probability of recovery, as reported above, lower than expected cashflows (associated with 
improved credit terms) do increase the probability of recovery.  
Given that Adj_REM2 is dominated by the impact of expenses and the fact that expenses 
data are available for only a subset of our sample, we do not employ Adj_REM2 in our 
supplementary analyses.  
 
5. Are CRAs Misled by Inflated Accounting Earnings? 
Our second hypothesis concerns the post credit watch performance of firms with a 
confirmed rating. The second hypothesis is related to the question of whether the rating agencies, 
which also play a monitoring role (Boot et al. 2006), are “fooled” by earnings management 
during the credit watch period or whether they treat the earnings management as a means of 
facilitating the dissemination of private information. Alissa et al. (2013) argue that rating 
agencies take financial statements at face value, since they do not see their role as auditors, and 
they show that earnings management strategies are successful in helping firms achieve their 
desired rating.17 However, DeFond and Park (1997) suggest that firms which expect poor current 
earnings to be followed by better future earnings elect to “borrow” earnings from the future. 
Firms which do not expect an improvement in their current earnings do not borrow from future 
earnings in this way. In this scenario earnings management conveys information about future 
performance. 
If CRAs are initially misled by earnings management, this would result in firms with 
confirmed ratings, which engage in higher levels of earnings management, having poorer longer-
term performance once the earnings management undertaken in the credit watch period reverses. 
                                                          
17 In related work, Bonsall et al. (2015) argue that the effectiveness of monitoring by CRAs deteriorates after initial 
rating issuance, since it is at the initial issue that the reputation effects are strongest. The fact that the rated firm pays 
for the rating also creates a disincentive for monitoring since the rating agency then has a vested interest in the 
survival of the firm (Manso (2013)). However, Manso (2013) goes on to argue that the potential for collusion is 
mitigated by the fact that the fee paid by any one firm is small relative to the potential impact of rating inaccuracies 
on the reputation capital of the CRA. 
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If CRAs see through the earnings management and treat it as a source of private information 
about future performance, confirmed firms which engage in higher levels of earnings 
management in the credit watch period would be associated with a better performance after the 
credit watch.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
We find that for confirmed firms, earnings reversals occur in the year after the credit 
watch period in line with earnings management during the credit watch period, and the change 
in return on assets is significantly more negative for confirmed firms than downgraded firms. 
However, despite earnings reversals we find that confirmed firms have a better accounting 
performance than downgraded firms. The earnings management and commensurate earnings 
reversals are clearly worthwhile from a credit rating point of view, since confirmed firms are 
significantly less likely to be downgraded and more likely to be upgraded than downgraded firms 
in the year following the conclusion of the credit watch period. Table 5 Panel B shows that 
16.56% (6.37%) of confirmed companies versus 25.99% (4.49%) of downgraded firms are 
further downgraded (upgraded). The ratio of firms acquired, liquidated and withdrawn is also 
significantly smaller for confirmed than downgraded firms (2.76% versus 5.67%). These results 
support our second hypothesis, that it is firms which can afford to do so which engage in earnings 
management, and that earnings management during the credit watch period is associated with a 
better credit rating performance in the post credit watch period. This suggests that CRAs see 
through the earnings management and treat it as a source of private information about future 
performance. 
 
6. The Interaction between Accruals-based and Real Earnings Management  
 
6.1. The trade-off between accruals-based and real earnings management 
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In this section, we consider whether there are any trade-offs between accruals-based and 
real earnings management. The interaction between accruals-based earnings management and 
real earnings management has been considered by Zang (2012) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
Cohen and Zarowin examine earnings management around seasonal equity offerings and Zang 
in relation to earnings targets, and in both cases the decision to engage in earnings management 
is determined endogenously and hence pre-planned, with lead-in times of around three years in 
the case of Cohen and Zarowin and not less than one year in the case of Zang. In our setting the 
imposition of a credit watch acts as an exogenous incentive to manage earnings and firms will 
have limited, if any, warning of the credit watch.18 As such there is limited, if any, opportunity 
to pre-plan earnings management. This difference in setting may have important implications for 
both the sequential order of earnings management and for substitution versus complementary 
effects. 
We begin our analysis by examining the correlations between the different earnings 
management measures in Panel A of Table 6. 
Insert Panel A of Table 6 here. 
The correlation matrix suggests that accruals-based and real earnings management act as 
complements rather than substitutes, contrary to prior findings. We suggest that this may be due 
to the “surprise” element of credit watches, their short-term nature and the certainty of negative 
consequences in the event of a rating downgrade. Given the need to act immediately, where the 
                                                          
18 We allow that the credit watch may be predictable in the period immediately prior to the credit watch and we can't 
rule out the possibility that in some cases CRAs warn managers that the firm will imminently be put on credit watch. 
For example, the model of Boot et al. (2006) suggests that a bad news signal will be received before any credit 
watch event, and Hand et al. (1992) argue that some credit watches may be predictable from relative bond yields 
(this is similar to employing a model of under or over valuation of the rating at the start of the credit watch, which 
we consider in Section 7). There is no evidence to suggest that the credit watch is predictable other than in the period 
immediately preceding its imposition, and this does not therefore impact our analysis. 
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decision to engage in earnings management is taken, firms might be inclined to employ both 
types of earnings management.19  
In our setting, firms may also lack time to arrange the order of earnings management 
techniques. Cohen and Zarowin assume that firms first select their level of accruals-based 
earnings management and the level of real earnings management is selected in accordance with 
the pre-selected level of accruals-based earnings management. Zang assumes the reverse. Since 
neither of these settings is similar to ours we start with the assumption that accruals-based and 
real earnings management are jointly determined and we employ a two-stage least squares 
estimation. The structural equations are set out at 10 and 11 below, and are designed to test the 
choice of accruals-based and real earnings management as a function of the costs and 
opportunities associated with each type of earnings management. We make no a priori 
assumption about the choice of earnings management strategy associated with the length of the 
credit watch and this appears as a common control variable. 
 
Adj_ABACC = β0 + [Common Controls: β1 LENGTH + β2 NOA + β3 OPCYCLE + β4 ROA + β5 
SIZE + β6 BM] + [Unique Exogenous: β7 LITIGATION + β8 BIGN + β9 TENURE] + β10 
Adj_REM1 + Sector Dummy + Year Dummy + Error  (10)
  
Adj_REM1 = β0 + [Common Controls: β1 LENGTH + β2 NOA + β3 OPCYCLE + β4 ROA + β5 
SIZE + β6 BM] + [Unique Exogenous: β7 MSHARE + β8 Z + β9 MTR] + β10 Adj_ABACC + Sector 
Dummy + Year Dummy + Error  (11) 
 
                                                          
19 We allow the possibility that the positive correlation may also reflect the fact that overproduction can lead to an 
increase in measured discretionary accruals (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), albeit the absolute value of the correlation 
between abnormal production and discretionary accruals is lower than that for abnormal cashflows.  
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Adj_ABACC and Adj_REM1 are the earnings management variables defined in Table 2.  
LENGTH is the log of the length of credit watch. The remaining earnings management variables 
are taken from Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012). NOA is net operating assets (Annual 
Compustat 144 + 9 + 34 - Annual Compustat 1) scaled by sales revenue (Annual Compustat 12); 
NOA is a determinant of accruals-based earnings management in Zang and real earnings 
management in Cohen and Zarowin, and is thus included as a common control. OPCYCLE is the 
operating cycle (days receivable plus days inventory less days payable at the end of the last year 
prior to the credit watch) and captures a firm’s accounting flexibility. Accounting flexibility 
impacts the ability of the firm to engage in accruals-based earnings management and thus the 
preference for real earnings management. The decision to include OPCYCLE as a common 
control at this stage is empirical.20 We also include return on assets (ROA), SIZE and book to 
market (BM). 
The unique determinants of accruals-based earnings management are LITIGATION 
(dummy equal to 1 if the sample firm operates in industries with SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 3600-3674, 7371-7379, 8731-8734), BIGN (dummy equal to 1 for big auditors21) and 
TENURE (length of audit tenure). Dechow et al. (1996) find that accruals-based earnings 
management is more likely to be detected and lead to legal action in industries with high litigation 
risk, while TENURE (see Cohen and Zarowin) and BIGN capture increased scrutiny and thus a 
                                                          
20 A Hausman tests confirms that OPCYCLE is a weak instrument for accruals-based earnings management and, 
further, it leads to over-identification when combined with the other instruments for accruals-based earnings 
management. The results of our two-stage least squares analysis suggests that accruals-based earnings management 
may indeed follow real earnings management and we show that operating cycle is a key determinant of the decision 
to engage in real earnings management. 
21 In order to create a comprehensive measure of Big Auditor we track all changes among top auditing firms that 
overlap with our sample period. In 1989, Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young to form Ernst & Young, and 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells merged with Touche Ross to form Deloitte Touche, which reduced the “Big 8” to the “Big 
6”: Arthur Andersen, Price Waterhouse, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick and Deloitte 
Touche. In 1998, Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers & Lybrand to form PricewaterhouseCoopers and thus the 
Big 6 were further reduced to the Big 5. In 2002, Arthur Andersen surrendered their auditing license, resulting in 
the Big 4. Our Big Auditor dummy is set to 1 if our sample firm was audited by the Big 6 before 1998, the Big 5 
between 1998 and 2002, and the Big 4 after 2002.  
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reduced opportunity to engage in accruals-based earnings management. The unique determinants 
of real earnings management are MSHARE (firm sales divided by total industry sales at the close 
of the year prior to the credit watch), Z (Altman’s z-score at the close of the year prior to the 
credit watch) and MTR (marginal tax rate22). Following Zang (2012), the cost of real earnings 
management is lower for market leaders and financially healthy firms (high Z), and higher for 
firms with a high marginal tax rate. 
At Stage 1 we estimate the reduced form equations, substituting for the right-hand-side 
values of Adj_ABACC and Adj_REM1 employing the variables derived from Equations 10 and 
11 above, to arrive at fitted values of Adj_ABACC and Adj_REM1. At Stage 2 we replace the 
right-hand-side values of Adj_ABACC and Adj_REM1 with their fitted values and estimate 
Equations 10 and 11 above. The results are set out in Columns 1 to 4, Panel B of Table 6. 
Insert Panel B of Table 6 about here. 
The coefficient of the fitted value of Adj_ABACC is significantly and positively 
associated with Adj_REM1 and the Hausman test confirms that Adj_ABACC is endogenous. 
Again, this suggests that where the credit watch motivates earnings management, both accruals-
based and real earnings management tend to be employed jointly. 
The fitted value of Adj_REM1 is not a significant determinant of Adj_ABACC and the 
Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis that Adj_REM1 is exogenous. Zang (2012) provides 
a similar finding and argues that this supports the assumption that accruals-based earnings 
management is determined after real earnings management. In light of this, we follow Zang 
(2012) by employing a sequential model in which we firstly model Adj_REM1 as a function of 
the costs and opportunities associated with both accruals and real earnings management, i.e. all 
the independent variables set out in Equations 10 and 11, excluding Adj_ABACC and Adj_REM1. 
                                                          
22 Available from https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html. 
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We then model accruals-based earnings management as a function of these same variables plus 
the predicted and unexpected levels of real earnings management. The results are set out in 
Columns 5 and 6, Panel B of Table 6. 
We find that both the predicted and unexpected level of real earnings management are 
significantly and positively related to the level of abnormal accruals-based earnings 
management. Again, we conclude that real and accruals-based earnings management are 
complements within our setting. The length of the credit watch period does not impact the choice 
of earnings management strategy. We find that the operating cycle and the financial health of the 
company (z-score) lead to substitution effects; the former relates to the opportunity to undertake 
accruals-based earnings management and the latter to the cost of real earnings management. 
Firms tend to use more real earnings management when their accounting flexibility is low, 
reflecting a decreased ability to undertake accruals-based earnings management, and when their 
financial health is high, reflecting a lower cost of real earnings management.  
We confirm that the results in this section are robust to the employment of the revised 
measure of accruals-based earnings management that incorporates the impact of idiosyncratic 
risk in accordance with the model of Owens et al. (2017), as set out in Section 7. 
 
6.2. The Impact of SOX on the use of Accruals-based and Real Earnings 
Management 
We consider that changes to the US financial reporting regulatory framework across time 
may impact the choice of recovery strategies employed by firms. Cohen et al. (2008) argue that 
firms tend to use real earnings management activities rather than accruals-based earnings 
management following the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) on August 29, 2002. With 
the advent of SOX, Cohen et al. (2008) argue that “accrual manipulations were more likely to 
draw auditors’ or regulators’ scrutiny than real earnings management” (page 761). In our paper, 
the purpose of the earnings manipulation is credit rating maintenance, however firms would still 
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be concerned about any litigation consequences. We therefore allow that the passing of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act may lead to a reduction in the use of accruals-based earnings management 
relative to real earnings management activities by firms seeking to convince the rating agencies 
of their recovery. To investigate we re-run Equation 9 separately across the 692 credit watches 
in the pre-SOX period and 537 credit watches in the post-SOX period.23 We present our results 
in Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
In Table 7 we confirm that accruals-based earnings management predicts recovery in the 
pre-SOX period. It is not, however, a significant determinant of recovery post-SOX. Conversely, 
the real earnings management strategies represented by high levels of Adj_ABPROD and 
Adj_REM1 become (more) significant in the post-SOX period, where Adj_REM1 is the 
composite measure of real earnings management suggested by Cohen et al. (2008), which takes 
account of the joint impact of abnormal cashflows and production expenses.  
To confirm that SOX precipitated a change in firm behaviour in respect of accruals-based 
earnings management, we compare the level of accruals-based earnings management for our 
sample firms in the pre- and post-SOX period (untabulated). This comparison fails to confirm 
that our sample firms reduced the level of accruals-based earnings management post-SOX. In 
turn, this implies that it is the rating agencies, rather than our sample firms, that switched strategy 
as a result of SOX; real earnings management becomes a relatively more important indicator of 
recovery after SOX, whereas accruals-based earnings management is relatively more important 
pre-SOX. Dimitrov et al. (2015) show that an increase in regulatory scrutiny causes the CRAs to 
become more conservative (and results in a loss of information to the market). Our finding 
                                                          
23 In Section 7 we consider the impact of under- (below or at target rating) and over-valuation (above target rating) 
on recovery likelihood. The proportion of firms with credit ratings above target does not significantly differ across 
the pre- and post-SOX periods.  
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implies that the advent of increased scrutiny post-SOX increased CRA conservatism in relation 
to accruals-based earnings management. 
 
7.  Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, we outline other sensitivity tests we conduct to ensure that our results are 
robust. These results are available from the authors upon request.  
In our sensitivity tests we examine how our results are affected when we consider the 
impact of performance on measured accruals earnings management, the impact of the length of 
the credit watch on earnings management, the impact of a firm’s target credit rating on incentives 
to engage in earnings management, the ability of manufacturing firms to engage in 
overproduction, any confounding effects of contemporaneous credit watches instigated by 
Moody’s and the potential impact of auditor reputation on earnings credibility. We dedicate a 
paragraph to each of these six additional tests.  
We address the impact of performance on measured discretionary accruals via the method 
of Owens et al. (2017). They suggest that an improved measure of discretionary accruals can be 
achieved by also accounting for firm idiosyncratic risk in the model of Jones et al. (1991). The 
inclusion of idiosyncratic risk in our measure of discretionary accruals does not alter our 
conclusions. Employing this revised measure, we continue to find that for confirmed firms, 
discretionary accruals are increased during the credit watch period, but not before and not after. 
We find that the likelihood that a firm will recover is significantly related to higher levels of 
abnormal accrued earnings. 
We consider the possibility that there is a greater incentive to manage earnings for longer 
credit watch periods where the downgrade happens after the quarterly figures are released. Firms 
with shorter credit watches might refrain from managing earnings if their efforts are unlikely to 
be seen until after the end of the credit watch period. Two counter arguments to the theory that 
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longer credit watches lead to more earnings management are as follows: First, ex ante a firm 
does not know how long the credit watch period will last and thus would be incentivised to start 
earnings management on announcement of the credit watch (earnings management would on 
average be unlikely to completely reverse in the very short term such that both earnings 
management and its reversal occur within one quarterly period). Second, while quarterly is the 
greatest frequency with which data are available to us, firms are not restricted to quarterly 
intervals in passing information to the rating agencies. Quarterly figures will reflect ex post what 
has happened on a more frequent basis during the credit watch period. We therefore examine 
separately short (< 3 months) and long (> 3 months) credit watch periods.24 We conclude that 
the length of the credit watch period does not materially affect the employment of earnings 
management as a recovery strategy. Firms are motivated to engage in earnings management even 
where the credit watch turns out to be short, which we suggest is explained by the two counter 
arguments we present.  
Roychowdhury (2006) investigates the use of real earnings management to avoid 
reporting losses and thus controls for incentives to avoid reporting losses. Similarly, we 
investigate the role of incentives for a firm to recover its rating. We employ the target rating 
model of Alissa et al. (2013) and we assume that firms have a greater incentive to avoid a 
downgrade if they are either below or at their target rating and a lesser incentive if they are 
already above their target rating. We find that being above target versus below or at target does 
not affect the impact earnings management and the distance from the target rating is therefore 
more likely to capture under- or over-valuation rather than incentives to recover. We find that 
this under- or over-valuation determines outcomes independently of earnings management; firms 
which are not over-valued, since their ratings are at or below target, are associated with an 
                                                          
24 We select the period of three months to define “short” and “long” since this is the time period during which the 
rating agencies aim to complete any credit watch review (Hill and Faff, 2010). 
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increased probability of recovery. Most importantly, the earnings management variables remain 
significant in the presence of the target rating variable. 
Firms which offer price discounts to boost sales would be expected to have abnormally 
high production costs relative to sales. In Table 4 we report that firms with abnormally high 
production costs are more likely to recover. However, manufacturing firms also have the 
opportunity to decrease their cost of goods sold via overproduction, where overproduction would 
also result in abnormally high production costs. The logic behind overproduction is that 
(assuming variable costs per unit are constant) fixed costs would then be spread over a larger 
number of units, resulting in a lower COGS and higher margins. Roychowdhury (2006) argues 
that given only manufacturing firms can engage in overproduction, the opportunity to boost 
reported short-term performance via high abnormal production costs is greater for manufacturing 
firms. We re-estimate Equation 9 across manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms separately 
and find that abnormal production costs are more strongly related to the probability of recovery 
in manufacturing firms than non-manufacturing firms.  
Where a firm is placed on negative credit watch by Moody’s before being placed on credit 
watch by Standard and Poor’s, the Moody’s credit watch might act as the trigger for earnings 
management. Moody’s started providing credit watch information from 1992. 1,173 observations 
(95.4% of our sample) occur in the period from 1992 to 2011. Among these 1,173 observations, 
there are 390 observations where Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s credit watches overlap, and 
44 observations where Moody’s announced a credit watch prior to the Standard and Poor’s credit 
watch announcement. We remove these 44 observations and re-estimate our main results. We 
confirm that results based on this modified sample are not materially affected. 
We also consider the impact of auditor reputation on our results. Alissa et al. (2013) argue 
that the CRAs are not auditors and have no incentive to monitor the veracity of accounting 
numbers. However, it is possible that CRAs are more likely to accept reported figures when they 
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are supported by the reputation of a big auditor. We find that 95% of our sample firms were 
audited by “Big Auditors” and thus the sample composition suggests that auditor reputation will 
not materially affect our results.  
 
8.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we test whether firms use earnings management as a short-term recovery 
strategy to avoid a credit rating downgrade. A firm faces a threat of a credit rating downgrade 
when it is put on a negative credit watch by the CRAs. A negative credit watch ends with either 
a confirmation of the current credit rating or a downgrade. The existing theoretical literature 
(Boot et al. 2006) suggests that while on credit watch firms have the chance to put in place 
recovery efforts to avoid a downgrade. We investigate short-term strategies targeted at increasing 
accounting earnings.  
Based on a sample of negative credit watches issued by Standard & Poor’s for US listed 
firms between 1989 and 2011 we find that strategies targeted at increasing accounting earnings 
are successfully employed by firms to avoid a credit rating downgrade and thereby make a 
successful recovery. Issuers use both accruals-based and real earnings management as recovery 
strategies. Real earnings management and accruals-based earnings management work as 
complements, which confirms the importance of analysing them both. However, while real 
earnings management continues to determine successful recovery post-SOX, accruals-based 
earnings management does not.  
We find that firms with confirmed ratings, which engage in higher levels of earnings 
management, have better longer-term rating performance despite the fact that earnings 
management reverses. In line with the findings of DeFond and Park (1997), we suggest that 
earnings management is employed to avoid an imminent rating downgrade by firms that are able 
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to afford an earnings reversal. It would appear that the CRAs recognise earnings management 
and are guided rather than misled by its employment. 
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Table 1 
Credit Watch Frequencies for the Full and Matched Samples 
 
 Universe 
Sample with Earnings 
Management Data 
 N Confirmed Downgraded N Confirmed Downgraded 
All Negative Watches 2,076 38% 62% 1,229 38% 62% 
Panel A: Frequency of Credit Watch by Year 
1989-1994 154 37% 63% 103 40% 60% 
1995-2000 611 35% 65% 435 34% 66% 
2001-2006 855 38% 62% 461 42% 58% 
2007-2011 456 41% 59% 230 39% 61% 
Panel B: Frequency of Credit Watch (CW) by CW Length in Months 
LENGTH< = 1 month 253 32% 68% 124 31% 69% 
1 month<LENGTH<3 months 753 36% 64% 419 37% 63% 
3 months<LENGTH<6 months 573 39% 61% 334 37% 63% 
6 months< LENGTH<12 
months 
336 41% 59% 234 43% 57% 
LENGTH>12 months 161 42% 58% 118 46% 54% 
Panel C: Frequency of Credit Watch by Credit Quality 
AAA 10 10% 90% 8 12% 88% 
AA 67 22% 78% 50 18% 82% 
A 376 32% 68% 251 34% 66% 
BBB 540 33% 67% 329 34% 66% 
BB 574 38% 62% 336 40% 60% 
B 431 49% 51% 218 52% 48% 
CCC and below 78 41% 59% 37 49% 51% 
Panel D: Frequency of Credit Watch by Fama French Sector 
Consumer Non-Durables 205 31% 69% 133 24% 76% 
Consumer Durables 95 27% 73% 50 30% 70% 
Manufacturing 350 36% 64% 224 36% 64% 
Energy 146 48% 52% 97 44% 56% 
Chemistry 90 44% 56% 76 45% 55% 
Business Equipment 174 43% 57% 124 40% 60% 
Telecoms 207 36% 64% 125 37% 63% 
Utilities 155 47% 53% 114 54% 46% 
Retail 248 26% 74% 116 28% 72% 
Health 90 50% 50% 53 53% 47% 
Other 316 40% 60% 117 41% 59% 
 
Table 1 presents credit watch statistics by (i) year (ii) length of credit watch (iii) credit quality and (iv) sector, for 
both the universe of 2,076 qualifying negative credit watches and our sample of 1,229 qualifying negative watches 
with earnings management data. The sample and universe statistics are very similar in all cases. We employ the 
sectors of the “12 Industry Portfolios” of Fama and French, from which we exclude the financial sector. 
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Table 2  
Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A. Measures of Earnings Management 
Adj_ABACC 
 
Performance-adjusted abnormal accruals. To determine the portion of discretionary 
accruals in total accruals we employ the regression model of Jones (1991) (with 
quarterly dummies), which we estimate for each quarter and 2-digit SIC industry 
portfolio. The regression coefficients for the appropriate industry and quarter are 
used to calculate discretionary accruals in the credit watch window. To allow for 
the impact of performance on discretionary accruals we further divide firms into 
portfolios based on ROA quintiles (in addition to quarter and 2-digit SIC codes). 
The performance adjusted abnormal accrual, Adj_ABACC, for each sample firm 
equals the discretionary accruals of the firm minus the discretionary accruals of the 
industry/ROA/quarter matched portfolio. 
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 
We incorporate the idiosyncratic risk measure of Owens et al. (2017) into the 
regression model of Jones (1991), following which the measure follows that of 
Adj_ABACC set out above. 
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK2 
As an alternative to incorporating idiosyncratic risk into the Jones (1991) model, 
we adjust the performance-adjusted benchmark such that 
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK2, equals the discretionary accruals of the firm minus 
the average discretionary accruals of the industry/ROA/IDIOSHOCK/quarter 
matched portfolio. 
Adj_ABCFO 
Performance-adjusted abnormal cash flows. First we determine the relationship 
between cashflows and sales for each quarter and 2-digit SIC code via the 
regression model of Roychowdhury (2006) (with quarterly dummies). The 
regression coefficients for the appropriate industry and quarter are used to calculate 
abnormal cashflows in the credit watch window for each sample firm employing 
firm level data on quarter, cashflows and sales. To allow for the impact of 
performance on cashflows we further divide firms into portfolios based on ROA 
quintiles (in addition to quarter and 2-digit SIC industry codes). The performance-
adjusted abnormal cashflow for each sample firm equals the abnormal cashflows 
of the firm minus the abnormal cashflows of the industry/ROA/quarter matched 
portfolio. 
Adj_ABPROD 
Performance-adjusted abnormal production costs. We follow the method described 
for Adj_ABCFO above. The performance-adjusted abnormal production cost for 
each sample firm equals the abnormal production costs of the firm minus the 
abnormal production costs of the industry/ROA/quarter matched portfolio. 
Adj_ABEXP 
Performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary expenses. We follow the method 
described for Adj_ABCFO above. The performance-adjusted abnormal 
discretionary expenses for each sample firm equals the abnormal discretionary 
expenses of the firm minus the abnormal discretionary expenses of the 
industry/ROA/quarter matched portfolio. This measure is available for 453 out of 
1,229 credit watches. 
Adj_REM1 
We follow Cohen et al. (2010) to construct a comprehensive measure of real 
earnings management, where Adj_REM = (-1)* Adj_ABCFO + Adj_ABPROD. 
We do not include Adj_ABEXP as data on discretionary expenses are missing for 
a large number of our sample firms. 
Adj_REM2 
Adj_REM2 is an alternative comprehensive measure of real earnings management, 
given the potential for cash flows to be either increased (e.g. cutting expenses) or 
reduced (e.g. overproduction) as a result of real earnings management. Adj_REM2 
= Adj_ABPROD - Adj_ABEXP. This measure is only available for 453 out of 
1,229 credit watches and is therefore only employed in our main results.   
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Cont’d Table 2 
Variable Descriptions 
 
Panel B. Variables Used to Calculate Earnings Management Measures 
TA Total accruals divided by total assets (∆40 - ∆36 - ∆49 + ∆45 –5)/44 
SALES Sales revenue divided by total assets (2/44) 
PPEGT Gross PPE divided by total assets (118/44) 
CFO 
Operating cash flows divided by total assets. We adjust the up-to-year variable to retrieve the 
quarterly operating cash flow (108/44) 
PROD Production costs divided by total assets (30 + ∆38)/44 
EXP 
Discretionary expenses (selling, general and administrative expenses, and research and 
development expenses) divided by total assets. (1 + 4)/44 
Panel C. Proxies for Firm Recovery 
RATING 
The cardinal values of S&P’s credit rating. 21 = AAA, 20 = AA+, 1 = C.  
12 = BBB- is the boundary between investment and speculative grades. 
INTCOVER Operating income before depreciation divided by interest expense (21/22). 
PPE Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets (tangibility ratio) (42/44). 
SGA Selling, general and administrative expense divided by sales (1/2). 
SIZE Natural log of total assets at the beginning of credit watch Ln (44). 
RECESSION 
Dummy variable =1 if the month of credit watch announcement occurs in a recession as 
defined by the U.S. Federal Reserve 
LENGTH 
The number of calendar days between the beginning and the end of credit watch. We also 
employ an alternative definition based on trading days. 
Table 2 contains definitions of variables. “Firm Recovery” variables are measured employing data for the most recent 
quarter prior to the credit watch. 
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Table 3 
Earnings Management around the Credit Watch Period 
 Panel A: Mean Comparison 
Firm Actions 
Sample 
Size 
N with 
Data 
Pre & 
Post  
Credit Rating 
Outcome 
Pre- 
Credit 
Watch 
During 
Credit Watch 
Post- 
Credit 
Watch 
Comparison
: 
During 
vs. Pre 
Comparison: 
During vs. 
Post 
Earnings Management        
Adj_ABACC 471 351 Confirmed 
-0.17% 
(-1.30) 
0.68%*** 
(3.90) 
-0.16% 
(-1.20) 
0.85%*** 
(3.78) 
0.84%*** 
(3.82) 
 758 583 Downgraded 
0.13% 
(1.20) 
-0.18% 
(-1.48) 
0.09% 
(0.82) 
-0.31%* 
(-1.81) 
-0.27%* 
(-1.68) 
Adj_ABCFO 471 423 Confirmed 
0.49%*** 
(4.50) 
0.08% 
(0.52) 
0.59%*** 
(5.40) 
-0.42%** 
(-2.54) 
-0.52%*** 
(-3.04) 
 758 713 Downgraded 
0.09% 
(0.95) 
0.69%*** 
(6.37) 
0.51%*** 
(5.70) 
0.60%*** 
(4.64) 
0.18% 
(1.25) 
Adj_ABPROD 471 428 Confirmed 
0.48%*** 
(2.73) 
0.93%*** 
(4.27) 
0.30%* 
(1.77) 
0.45%*** 
(2.61) 
0.63%*** 
(3.49) 
 758 699 Downgraded 
-0.03% 
(-0.21) 
-0.22% 
(-1.38) 
-0.06% 
(-1.39) 
-0.19% 
(-1.55) 
-0.16% 
(-1.24) 
Adj_ABEXP 471 109 Confirmed 
-2.86%*** 
(-8.92) 
-3.17%*** 
(-5.72) 
-2.86%*** 
(-8.74) 
-0.31% 
(-0.59) 
-0.31% 
(-0.58) 
 758 193 Downgraded 
-2.20%*** 
(-7.69) 
-2.82%*** 
(-8.23) 
-2.32%*** 
(-8.22) 
-0.62%*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.50%** 
(-2.17) 
Adj_REM1 471 399 Confirmed 
-0.02% 
(-0.10) 
0.75%** 
(2.35) 
-0.29% 
(-1.19) 
0.78%*** 
(2.63) 
1.04%*** 
(3.59) 
 758 685 Downgraded 
-0.10% 
(-0.54) 
-0.93%*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.56%*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.83%*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.37% 
(-1.59) 
Adj_REM2 471 104 Confirmed 
2.48%*** 
(4.54) 
2.75%*** 
(4.20) 
2.24%*** 
(4.02) 
0.27% 
(0.51) 
0.51% 
(0.93) 
 758 189 Downgraded 
2.15%*** 
(4.49) 
2.24%*** 
(4.14) 
1.85%*** 
(3.97) 
0.09% 
(0.27) 
0.39% 
(1.06) 
 Panel B: Median Comparison 
Firm Actions 
Sample 
Size 
N with 
Data 
Pre & 
Post  
Credit Rating 
Outcome 
Pre- 
Credit 
Watch 
During 
Credit Watch 
Post- 
Credit 
Watch 
Comparison
: 
During 
vs. Pre 
Comparison: 
During vs. 
Post 
Earnings Management        
Adj_ABACC 471 351 Confirmed 
-0.10% 
(-1.14) 
0.43%*** 
(4.33) 
-0.16% 
(-1.61) 
0.51%*** 
(3.59) 
0.49%*** 
(4.09) 
 758 583 Downgraded 
0.11% 
(1.12) 
-0.18%* 
(-1.66) 
0.08% 
(-0.64) 
-0.12% 
(-1.61) 
-0.20% 
(-1.39) 
Adj_ABCFO 471 423 Confirmed 
0.48%*** 
(5.07) 
0.11% 
(1.29) 
0.42%*** 
(5.33) 
-0.21%** 
(-2.27) 
-0.24%*** 
(-2.97) 
 758 713 Downgraded 
0.14%* 
(1.71) 
0.59%*** 
(8.33) 
0.40%*** 
(5.56) 
0.42%*** 
(4.85) 
0.14% 
(1.31) 
Adj_ABPROD 471 428 Confirmed 
-0.10% 
(-0.92) 
0.14%** 
(2.49) 
-0.22% 
(-0.10) 
0.31%*** 
(3.05) 
0.36%*** 
(3.41) 
 758 699 Downgraded 
-0.17% 
(-1.49) 
-0.34%*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.29% 
(-1.42) 
-0.07% 
(-1.42) 
-0.13%* 
(-1.94) 
Adj_ABEXP 471 109 Confirmed 
-2.87%*** 
(-6.99) 
-2.51%*** 
(-6.91) 
-2.85%*** 
(-7.14) 
-0.03% 
(-0.27) 
-0.08% 
(-0.42) 
 758 193 Downgraded 
-2.10%*** 
(-6.94) 
-2.40%*** 
(-7.85) 
-1.88%*** 
(-7.14) 
-0.29%** 
(-2.41) 
-0.10% 
(-1.48) 
Adj_REM1 471 399 Confirmed 
-0.67% 
(-1.32) 
-0.03% 
(0.85) 
-0.57%** 
(-2.22) 
0.50%** 
(2.57) 
0.68%*** 
(3.32) 
 758 685 Downgraded 
-0.40%* 
(-1.82) 
-1.02%*** 
(-5.80) 
-0.59%*** 
(-3.71) 
-0.70%*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.35%* 
(-1.91) 
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Adj_REM2 471 104 Confirmed 
2.14%*** 
(4.02) 
1.69%*** 
(3.98) 
2.78%*** 
(3.88) 
0.19% 
(-0.14) 
-0.29% 
(-0.48) 
 758 189 Downgraded 
2.60%*** 
(4.40) 
2.25%*** 
(4.18) 
1.56%*** 
(3.93) 
-0.21% 
(-0.04) 
-0.28% 
(-0.76) 
Table 3 presents mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) values of our key variables across confirmed and downgraded firms. There are 471 confirmed 
firms and 758 downgraded firms in our sample, however for a small number of firms pre- and post-credit watch figures are not available. For 
Adj_ABEXP and Adj_REM2, data are only available for 453 out of 1,229 credit watches (see Table 2), and only a subset of these 453 have data pre- 
and post-credit watch. The above figures are based on firms for which we have all pre- and post-credit watch data. All values are tested for 
significance against zero. We also report differences of the key variables between (i) the credit watch period and pre-credit watch period and (ii) the 
credit watch period and post-credit watch period, with t-tests used for mean values and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for median values. The pre- and 
post-credit watch periods are of equal length to the credit watch period. t-statistics and z-values are reported in the parentheses in Panels A and B, 
respectively. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Is Earnings Management during the Credit Watch Associated with the Credit Watch 
Outcome? 
Estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Earnings Management       
Adj_ABACC 4.6753** 
     
 (2.41)      
Adj_ABCFO  -6.6935***     
  (-2.92)     
Adj_ABPROD   4.2857**    
   (2.38)    
Adj_ABEXP     
0.4707 
(0.20) 
 
 
       
Adj_REM1     3.8822***  
     (3.06)  
Adj_REM2      1.8659 
      (1.04) 
Recovery Control       
RATING 
-0.1973*** 
(-6.86) 
-0.1949*** 
(-6.69) 
-0.1989*** 
(-6.95) 
-0.2493*** 
(-4.80) 
-0.1953*** 
(-6.77) 
-0.2434*** 
(-4.69) 
LENGTH 
0.0007** 
(2.10) 
0.0007** 
(2.01) 
0.0007** 
(2.09) 
0.0002 
(0.41) 
0.0007** 
(2.06) 
0.0002 
(0.40) 
INTCOVER 
0.0276** 
(2.44) 
0.0271** 
(2.40) 
0.0301*** 
(2.62) 
0.0135 
(1.07) 
0.0287** 
(2.51) 
0.0156 
(1.21) 
PPE 
0.388 
(1.11) 
0.4810 
(1.35) 
0.5563 
(1.56) 
1.6190** 
(2.28) 
0.6101* 
(1.70) 
1.7771** 
(2.45) 
SGA 
-2.5014** 
(-4.34) 
-2.4138*** 
(-4.21) 
-1.8411*** 
(-2.95) 
-1.1603 
(-1.18) 
-1.8569*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.4069 
(-0.38) 
SIZE 
0.1911*** 
(3.47) 
0.1854*** 
(3.32) 
0.1849*** 
(3.34) 
0.2494*** 
(2.68) 
0.1825*** 
(3.28) 
0.2539*** 
(2.73) 
RECESSION 
-0.5676*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.5594*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.5593*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.7680*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.5554*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.7912*** 
(-2.78) 
Constant 
0.9229** 
(2.28) 
0.8875** 
(2.18) 
0.7421* 
(1.80) 
0.6163 
(0.81) 
0.6968* 
(1.69) 
0.2384 
(0.32) 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,229 1,229 1,229 453 1,229 453 
PSEUDO R2 0.0807 0.0824 0.0815 0.1057 0.0842 0.1074 
Marginal Effects Adj_ABACC Adj_ABCFO Adj_ABPROD Adj_ABEXP Adj_REM Adj_REM2 
% Δ Pr. Recovery for 1 SD increase in variable 3.69 -4.56 4.51 0.58 5.52 3.33 
Table 4 presents coefficients for the following model: 
 
Logit (=1 Confirmed; =0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Firm Actions + β2 RATING + β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE + β6 SGA + β7 
SIZE + β8 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed, 0 = downgraded). Firm Actions relate to each of the earnings 
management variables. We control for the initial credit rating, length of the credit watch period and firm characteristics prior to the credit watch and 
the macro-economic environment. To control for industry effects, we employ the sectors of the “12 Industry Portfolios” of Fama and French, from 
which we exclude the financial sector. We calculate White standard errors with firm level clustering. We present marginal effects of Firm Actions 
by holding other variables at their mean value and calculating the change in the probability of a rating confirmation when the test variable is increased 
by one standard deviation. z-values are given in brackets and ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables 
are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Firm Performance and Rating Changes Subsequent to a Negative 
Credit Watch 
 
Confirmed Downgraded 
Panel A. Firm Performance (N = 1,149 firms with non-missing ROA1) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
ROA0 
4.63%***, † 
(8.98) 
2.45%***, † 
(8.16) 
2.15%*** 
(5.51) 
0.54%*** 
(3.75) 
ROA1 
3.55%***, † 
(6.81) 
1.65%***, † 
(6.23) 
2.30%*** 
(5.94) 
0.50%*** 
(4.30) 
∆ROA[0,1] 
-1.08%***, † 
(-3.03) 
-0.02%** 
(-2.21) 
0.15% 
(0.63) 
0.00% 
(0.83) 
Panel B. Rating Changes (N = 1,229) 
% DG[0,1] 
16.56%***,† 
(9.66) 
25.99%*** 
(16.30) 
% UG[0,1] 
6.37%*** 
(5.65) 
4.49%*** 
(5.96) 
% Stable[0,1] 
74.31%***,† 
(36.67) 
63.85%*** 
(36.57) 
% Acquired, Liquidated, 
and Withdrawn[0,1] 
2.76%***,† 
(3.65) 
5.67%*** 
(6.75) 
Table 5 compares the one-year post-credit watch performance of firms which have their rating confirmed with firms which have their rating 
downgraded. ROAt is the industry-adjusted ROA for the year of the credit watch (t = 0) and the year after the credit watch (t = 1). We follow Denis 
and Kruse (2000) and we create portfolios based on SIC code employing all firms in the Compustat database. For each firm, a matched portfolio is 
formed during the credit watch year with the same 2-digit SIC. The industry adjusted ROA is therefore the ROA of the credit watch firm minus the 
average ROA of the matched portfolio. % Acquired, Liquidated and Withdrawn measures the frequency with which firms are acquired, liquidated 
or have their rating withdrawn in the year following the credit watch. In Panel A, we report t-tests for the means and Wilcoxon’s rank-sum tests for 
the medians (z-values). In Panel B, the proportions of downgraded and confirmed firms are tested against zero (t-tests) and Confirmed and 
Downgraded are tested for the difference in proportions (z-test). ***, **, * indicate a statistical difference from zero with a significance level of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. ‘†’ denotes statistical difference between firms with Confirmed and Downgraded ratings at a 5% level. All variables are 
defined in Table 2. 
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Table 6 
Trade-off between Accruals-based and Real Earnings Management 
 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix between Earnings Management Measures 
 Adj_ABACC 
Adj_ABACC 
_IDIOSHOCK1 
Adj 
_ABCFO 
Adj 
_ABPROD 
Adj 
_ABEXP 
Adj_REM1 Adj_REM2 
Adj_ABACC 1       
Adj_ABACC_ISHOCK1 0.2327*** 1      
Adj_ABCFO -0.3674*** -0.1301*** 1     
Adj_ABPROD 0.1603*** 0.0601* -0.3127*** 1    
Adj_ABEXP 0.0001 0.1362*** -0.2772*** -0.1972*** 1   
Adj_REM1 0.2959*** 0.1066*** -0.7096*** 0.8902*** -0.0106 1  
Adj_REM2 0.1171** -0.0471 -0.0304 0.7356*** -0.8092*** 0.5478*** 1 
Panel A presents the Pearson correlation matrix for our earnings management proxies. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis of Trade-off 
 2SLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stage First Second First Second First Second 
Dep Y of Each Stage AEM REM REM AEM REM AEM 
Fitted REM    0.0466  0.3167*** 
    (0.38)  (3.25) 
Fitted AEM  1.8810**     
  (2.40)     
Unfitted REM      0.1773*** 
      (5.59) 
Common Controls for AEM 
and REM 
      
LENGTH -0.0004 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0005 
 (-0.67) (0.90) (0.64) (-0.73) (0.64) (-0.86) 
NOA -0.0042** -0.0021 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0053* 
 (-2.39) (-0.43) (-0.64) (-1.18) (-0.64) (-1.68) 
OPCYCLE 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0001** 
 (1.25) (-3.73) (-3.87) (0.77) (-3.87) (2.46) 
ROA -0.0106 -0.0752** -0.0611** -0.0060 -0.0611** 0.0225 
 (-0.64) (-2.15) (-2.20) (-0.40) (-2.20) (1.17) 
SIZE -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0010 0.0009 
 (-1.34) (-0.18) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.45) (0.84) 
BM -0.0045 0.0085 0.0068 -0.0027 0.0068 -0.0028 
 (-1.45) (1.20) (1.14) (-0.84) (1.14) (-0.90) 
Unique Controls AEM       
LITIGATION -0.0089*  -0.0248*** -0.0072 -0.0248*** -0.0084* 
 (-1.88)  (-2.93) (-1.27) (-2.93) (-1.84) 
BIGN -0.0086*  -0.0071 -0.0073 -0.0071 -0.0063 
 (-1.67)  (-0.77) (-1.45) (-0.77) (-1.10) 
TENURE 0.0016  0.0026 0.0020 0.0026 0.0011 
 (0.68)  (0.63) (0.90) (0.63) (0.49) 
Unique Controls REM       
MSHARE 0.0009 0.0171* 0.0178**  0.0178** -0.0045 
 (0.18) (1.77) (2.15)  (2.15) (-0.91) 
Z -0.0009 0.0062*** 0.0047***  0.0047*** -0.0025** 
 (-1.05) (3.34) (3.03)  (3.03) (-2.39) 
MTR 0.0018 0.0458 0.0401  0.0401 -0.0139 
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 (0.12) (1.54) (1.54)  (1.54) (-1.02) 
Constant 0.0433*** -0.0525 -0.0145 0.0310** -0.0145 0.0276 
 (3.27) (-1.32) (-0.59) (2.39) (-0.59) (1.42) 
Sector and Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0770 0.1290 0.1160 0.1168 0.1160 0.1732 
N 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 
Hausman Test (F) 4.25  1.17    
(p-value) (0.04)  (0.28)    
Weak Instrument Test (Partial  
F) 
2.35  6.38    
(p-value) (0.07)  (0.00)    
Overidentification Test (χ2) 1.65  0.11    
(p-value) (0.44)  (0.94)    
In Panel B of Table 10, AEM is accruals-based earnings management and REM is real earnings management. Columns (1) – (4) present the 
2SLS results of estimating the following structural models: 
 
Adj_ABACC = β0 + [Common Controls: β1 LENGTH + β2 NOA + β3 OPCYCLE + β4 ROA + β5 SIZE + β6 BM] + [Unique Exogenous: β7 
LITIGATION + β8 BIGN + β9 TENURE] + β10 Adj_REM1 + Sector Dummy + Year Dummy + Error  
 
Adj_REM1 = β0 + [Common Controls: β1 LENGTH + β2 NOA + β3 OPCYCLE + β4 ROA + β5 SIZE + β6 BM] + [Unique Exogenous: β7 
MSHARE + β8 Z + β9 MTR] + β10 Adj_ABACC + Sector Dummy + Year Dummy + Error 
 
At Stage 1 we estimate the reduced form equations, substituting for the rhs values of Adj_ABACC and Adj_REM1 employing the variables 
derived from the above equations to arrive at fitted values of Adj_ABACC and Adj_REM1. At Stage 2 we replace the rhs values of Adj_ABACC 
and Adj_REM1 with their fitted values and estimate the above equations. 
 
Columns (5) – (6) presents the OLS results of estimating the following models: 
 
Adj_REM1 = β0 + β1 LENGTH + β2 NOA + β3 OPCYCLE + β4 ROA + β5 SIZE + β6 BM + β7 LITIGATION + β8 BIGN + β9 TENURE + 
β10 MSHARE + β11 Z + β12 MTR + Sector Dummy + Year Dummy + Error (3); 
 
Adj_ABACC = β0 + β1 LENGTH + β2 NOA + β3 OPCYCLE + β4 ROA + β5 SIZE + β6 BM + β7 LITIGATION + β8 BIGN + β9 TENURE + 
β10 MSHARE + β11 Z + β12 MTR + β13 Fitted Adj_REM1 +β14 Unfitted Adj_REM1 + Sector Dummy + Year Dummy + Error (4); 
 
Adj_ABACC and _REM1 are earnings management variables defined in Table 2. LENGTH is the log of the length of credit watch. NOA is net 
operating assets (Annual Compustat 144 + 9 + 34 - Annual Compustat 1) scaled by sales revenue (Annual Compustat 12). OPCYCLE is the 
operating cycle (days receivable plus days inventory less days payable at the end of the last year prior to the credit watch). LITIGATION is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the sample firm operates in industries with SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 7371-7379, 8731-8734. BIGN 
is a dummy equal to 1 for big N auditors (see Section 6.7) and TENURE is the length of audit tenure. MSHARE is firm sales divided by total 
industry sales at the close of the year prior to the credit watch, Z is Altman’s z-score at the close of the year prior to the credit watch and MTR 
is the marginal tax rate. We also include return on assets (ROA), SIZE and book to market (BM). z-values (t-values) are given in brackets and 
***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Earnings Management & Credit Watch Outcome: Pre-SOX and Post-SOX Periods 
 Panel A: Pre-SOX Period Panel B: Post-SOX Period 
Estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Earnings Management           
Adj_ABACC 6.1859**     2.5541     
 (2.21)     (0.87)     
Adj_ABCFO  -8.5613**     -5.6997*    
  (-2.39)     (-1.66)    
Adj_ABPROD   2.1465     8.6536***   
   (0.90)     (3.49)   
Adj_ABEXP    1.5868     -0.0749  
    (0.49)     (-0.02)  
Adj_REM1     3.1349*     5.6240*** 
     (1.76)     (3.06) 
Recovery Control           
RATING -0.1537*** -0.1511*** -0.1575*** -0.2875*** -0.1547*** -0.2509*** -0.2439*** -0.2466*** -0.1850** -0.2408*** 
 (-3.99) (-3.91) (-4.11) (-3.63) (-4.04) (-4.85) (-4.66) (-4.65) (-2.20) (-4.54) 
LENGTH 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0006** 0.0004 0.0006* 0.0026** 0.0025** 0.0027*** 0.0008 0.0026** 
 (1.94) (1.91) (1.97) (0.70) (1.95) (2.55) (2.45) (2.59) (0.46) (2.51) 
INTCOVER -0.0034 -0.0042 -0.0015 -0.0031 -0.0020 0.0533*** 0.0509*** 0.0529*** 0.0223 0.0500*** 
 (-0.21) (-0.26) (-0.09) (-0.15) (-0.12) (3.18) (3.06) (3.12) (1.14) (2.97) 
PPE 0.6154 0.7777* 0.6693 1.3636 0.7823* 0.2989 0.3563 0.7711 2.1397* 0.6741 
 (1.36) (1.71) (1.49) (1.49) (1.72) (0.54) (0.63) (1.32) (1.86) (1.16) 
SGA -3.1240*** -3.0563*** -2.8094*** -2.1494 -2.6879*** -1.9190** -1.8313** -0.2964 -0.4704 -0.7532 
 (-3.60) (-3.57) (-3.08) (-1.43) (-3.01) (-2.31) (-2.22) (-0.33) (-0.32) (-0.86) 
SIZE 0.2147*** 0.2092*** 0.2100*** 0.2969** 0.2071*** 0.1144 0.1039 0.1073 0.1198 0.1010 
 (2.84) (2.72) (2.73) (2.22) (2.70) (1.19) (1.07) (1.11) (0.73) (1.03) 
RECESSION -0.5149** -0.4784* -0.5264** -0.7406 -0.4980* -0.6380*** -0.6465*** -0.6268*** -0.8834** -0.6386*** 
 (-2.00) (-1.84) (-2.05) (-1.64) (-1.93) (-2.73) (-2.73) (-2.62) (-2.10) (-2.65) 
Constant 0.4665 0.3900 0.4610 1.6080 0.3462 1.5334** 1.5235** 0.9166 -0.1922 1.0827 
 (0.91) (0.76) (0.91) (1.47) (0.67) (2.27) (2.27) (1.31) (-0.15) (1.58) 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 692 692 692 276 692 537 537 537 177 537 
PSEUDO R2 0.0841 0.0851 0.0782 0.1499 0.0817 0.1095 0.1126 0.1231 0.0876 0.1219 
Marginal Effects 4.99% -5.37% 2.12% 1.93% 4.12% 1.86% -4.22% 9.71% -0.09% 8.66% 
Table 7 summarises the relationship between firm actions and the credit watch outcome before and after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. We estimate the following equation on the pre- and post-SOX periods 
separately:  
Logit (=1 Confirmed; =0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Firm Actions + β2 RATING + β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE + β6 SGA + β7 SIZE + β8 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed, 0 = downgraded). Firm Actions relate to each of the earnings management variables. We control for the initial credit rating, length of the 
credit watch period and firm characteristics prior to the credit watch and the macro-economic environment. To control for industry effects, we employ the sectors of the “12 Industry Portfolios” of Fama and French, from which 
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we exclude the financial sector. We calculate White standard errors with firm level clustering. We present marginal effects of Firm Actions by holding other variables at their mean value and calculating the change in the probability 
of a rating confirmation when the test variable is increased by one standard deviation. z-values are given in brackets and ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
53 
 
 
 
The following tables are available from the authors on request  
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Supplementary Table 1 
Idiosyncratic Shocks and Discretionary Accruals 
 Panel A: Earnings Management Around the Credit Watch Period 
 Mean Comparison 
Firm Actions 
Sample 
Size 
N 
with 
Data 
Pre 
and 
Post  
Credit 
Rating 
Outcome 
Pre- 
Credit 
Watch 
During 
Credit Watch 
Post- 
Credit 
Watch 
Comparison: 
During 
versus 
Pre 
Comparison
: 
During 
versus 
Post 
Earnings Management        
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 471 309 Confirmed 
-0.23% 
(-0.97) 
0.62%*** 
(3.38) 
-0.79%*** 
(-3.58) 
0.85%*** 
(3.44) 
1.41%*** 
(5.21) 
 758 505 Downgraded 
-0.42%** 
(-2.45) 
-0.36%** 
(-2.17) 
-0.87%*** 
(-4.46) 
0.06% 
(-0.27) 
0.51%** 
(2.09) 
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK2 471 366 Confirmed 
-0.07% 
(-0.37) 
0.66%*** 
(3.96) 
-0.28% 
(-1.63) 
0.73%*** 
(3.36) 
0.94%*** 
(4.21) 
 758 592 Downgraded 
-0.06% 
(-0.43) 
-0.07%*** 
(-0.57) 
-0.31%** 
(-2.06) 
-0.01% 
(-0.10) 
0.24% 
(1.22) 
 Median Comparison 
Firm Actions 
Sampl
e Size 
N with 
Data 
Pre and 
Post  
Credit 
Rating 
Outcome 
Pre- 
Credit 
Watch 
During 
Credit Watch 
Post- 
Credit 
Watch 
Comparison: 
During 
versus 
Pre 
Comparison
: 
During 
versus 
Post 
Earnings Management        
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 471 309 Confirmed 
-0.15% 
(-1.10) 
0.56%*** 
(3.08) 
-0.43%*** 
(-3.36) 
0.39%*** 
(3.32) 
0.72%*** 
(4.60) 
 758 505 Downgraded 
-0.28%*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.22%** 
(-2.01) 
-0.76%*** 
(-4.50) 
0.17% 
(0.31) 
0.26%* 
(1.91) 
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 471 366 Confirmed 
0.02% 
(-0.15) 
0.20%*** 
(3.51) 
-0.17%* 
(-1.74) 
0.27%*** 
(3.06) 
0.55%*** 
(3.80) 
 758 592 Downgraded 
0.00% 
(-0.31) 
0.00% 
(-0.52) 
-0.17%** 
(-2.55) 
-0.10% 
(-0.40) 
0.04% 
(0.69) 
 
Panel B: Earnings Management and the Credit Watch Outcome 
 
Estimations (1) (2) 
Earnings Management   
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 4.4587**  
 (2.45)  
Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK2  5.1077*** 
  (2.66) 
   
 
In this table, we repeat the analyses of Tables 3 and 4 incorporating idiosyncratic risk into our measure of discretionary accruals. IDIOSHOCK is the 
measure of idiosyncratic risk of the firm as set out in Owens et al. (2017). Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 incorporates idiosyncratic risk into the 
estimations of total and discretionary accruals (see Equations 10-12). Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 equals the discretionary accruals of the firm minus 
the average discretionary accrual of the industry/ROA/quarter matched portfolio. Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK2 does not incorporate idiosyncratic risk 
into the estimation of total and discretionary accruals (see Equations 1 and 2), and equals the discretionary accruals of the firm minus the average 
discretionary accrual of the industry/ROA/quarter/IDIOSHOCK portfolio. 
In relation to Panel A, there are 471 confirmed firms and 758 downgraded firms in our sample, however for a small number of firms pre- and post-
credit watch figures are not available. The above figures are based on firms for which we have all pre- and post-credit watch data. The values are tested 
for significance against zero. We also report differences of the key variables between (i) the credit watch period and pre-credit watch period and (ii) the 
credit watch period and post-credit watch period, with t-tests used for mean values and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for median values. The pre- and post-
credit watch periods are of equal length to the credit watch period. t-statistics (z-values) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate a significance level 
of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
Panel B presents the coefficient for β1 in relation to the following estimation, which repeats the analysis in Table 4: 
 
Logit (=1 Confirmed; =0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 (2) + β2 RATING + β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE 
+ β6 SGA + β7 SIZE + β8 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies 
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The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed while 0 = downgraded). Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 (2) relates 
to abnormal accruals incorporating IDIOSHOCK, as defined for Panel A. All other variables are as set out for Table 4. z-values are given in brackets 
and ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Supplementary Table 2 
Univariate Tests of Earnings Management in the Credit Watch Period: 
Short Versus Long Credit Watch 
(N=1229) 
 Panel A: Short Credit Watch Panel B: Long Credit Watch 
 All Confirmed Downgraded 
Comparison: 
Confirmed 
versus 
Downgraded 
All Confirmed Downgraded 
Comparison: 
Confirmed 
versus 
Downgraded 
N 543 193 350  686 278 408  
Earnings Management         
Adj_ABACC Mean 543 
0.59%** 
(2.28) 
-0.04% 
(-0.18) 
0.63%** 
(1.97) 
686 
0.46%** 
(2.22) 
-0.19% 
(-1.36) 
0.65%*** 
(2.70) 
Adj_ABACC Median 543 
0.58%*** 
(2.76) 
-0.12% 
(-0.36) 
0.70%** 
(2.34%) 
686 
0.26%** 
(2.54) 
-0.21%* 
(-1.92) 
0.47%*** 
(3.09) 
Adj_ABCFO Mean 543 
-0.01% 
(-0.02) 
0.82%*** 
(4.18) 
-0.83%** 
(-2.52) 
686 
0.09% 
(0.66) 
0.57%*** 
(5.61) 
-0.48%*** 
(-2.86) 
Adj_ABCFO Median 543 
0.00% 
(0.98) 
0.67%*** 
(5.57) 
-0.67%*** 
(-3.41) 
686 
0.18% 
(1.45) 
0.55%*** 
(6.50) 
-0.37%*** 
(-2.96) 
Adj_ABPROD Mean 543 
1.59%*** 
(3.99) 
-0.33% 
(-1.21) 
1.92%*** 
(4.05) 
686 
0.71%*** 
(3.02) 
-0.06% 
(-0.33) 
0.77%*** 
(2.69) 
Adj_ABPROD Median 543 
0.37%*** 
(3.03) 
-0.60%*** 
(-2.89) 
0.97%*** 
(4.14) 
686 
0.15% 
(1.57%) 
-0.23% 
(-1.34) 
0.38%** 
(2.12) 
Adj_ABEXP Mean 193 
-4.02%*** 
(-5.26) 
-2.34%*** 
(-4.93) 
-1.68%** 
(-1.97) 
260 
-2.06%*** 
(-4.84) 
-2.46%*** 
(-5.83) 
0.40% 
(0.63) 
Adj_ABEXP Median 193 
-3.47%*** 
(-5.96) 
-2.20%*** 
(-4.81) 
-1.27%** 
(-2.08) 
260 
-2.13%*** 
(-4.84) 
-2.23%*** 
(-5.93) 
0.10% 
(0.02) 
In this table we present mean and median values of our key variables across confirmed and downgraded firms for the short credit watches 
(Panel A) and long credit watches (Panel B). Short credit watches comprise 543 credit watches with a duration of three months (63 trading 
days) or less (see Table 1: 124 + 419 = 543). Long credit watches have a duration of greater than three months. All values are tested for 
significance against zero and differences between Confirmed and Downgraded firms are also reported, with t-tests used for mean values and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for median values. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
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Supplementary Table 3 
Earnings Management & Credit Watch Outcome: Short Versus Long Credit Watch 
 Panel A: Short Credit Watch (Length<= 3 months) Panel B: Long Credit Watch (Length > 3 months) 
Estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Earnings Management           
Adj_ABACC 4.4123*     5.4939*     
 (1.70)     (1.83)     
Adj_ABCFO  -5.5901**     -8.8938**    
  (-1.96)     (-2.27)    
Adj_ABPROD   5.3664**     2.8063   
   (2.01)     (1.08)   
Adj_ABEXP1    -1.8140     5.2100  
    (-0.60)     (1.46)  
Adj_REM1     4.2790**     3.4421* 
     (2.35)     (1.85) 
Recovery Control           
RATING -0.1916*** -0.1896*** -0.1918*** -0.3978*** -0.1861*** -0.2127*** -0.2089*** -0.2143*** -0.1785*** -0.2115*** 
 (-3.88) (-3.79) (-3.92) (-3.72) (-3.75) (-5.89) (-5.71) (-5.89) (-2.64) (-5.80) 
LENGTH 0.0013 0.0011 0.0014 -0.0064 0.0011 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0001 0.0007* 
 (0.31) (0.25) (0.32) (-0.87) (0.25) (1.89) (1.74) (1.81) (0.21) (1.78) 
INTCOVER 0.0558*** 0.0527*** 0.0559*** 0.0408 0.0532*** 0.0148 0.0155 0.0179 0.0130 0.0172 
 (3.11) (2.92) (3.00) (1.21) (2.90) (1.15) (1.16) (1.35) (0.85) (1.29) 
PPE 0.0935 0.1754 0.3994 1.0655 0.4370 0.6287 0.7419 0.7038 2.0770** 0.7682 
 (0.17) (0.31) (0.67) (0.90) (0.74) (1.33) (1.56) (1.47) (2.15) (1.60) 
SGA -3.2151*** -3.1389*** -2.2432** -3.2320* -2.3948*** -2.1328*** -2.0142*** -1.7509** -0.7591 -1.6216* 
 (-3.59) (-3.55) (-2.38) (-1.86) (-2.64) (-2.73) (-2.58) (-2.00) (-0.57) (-1.92) 
SIZE 0.1597* 0.1509* 0.1428 0.5175*** 0.1374 0.2075*** 0.2036*** 0.2042*** 0.0445 0.2040*** 
 (1.77) (1.66) (1.55) (3.09) (1.49) (2.91) (2.83) (2.85) (0.34) (2.84) 
RECESSION -0.7256*** -0.7227*** -0.7102*** -0.3659 -0.7048*** -0.3805 -0.3758 -0.3751 -1.3119*** -0.3766 
 (-2.77) (-2.67) (-2.72) (-0.83) (-2.62) (-1.59) (-1.57) (-1.57) (-2.58) (-1.57) 
Constant 1.4510** 1.4315** 1.1544 1.0104 1.1539 0.7014 0.6542 0.6459 1.2070 0.5610 
 (2.06) (2.03) (1.60) (0.82) (1.60) (1.36) (1.26) (1.22) (1.07) (1.06) 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 543 543 543 193 543 686 686 686 260 686 
PSEUDO R2 0.1006 0.1025 0.1061 0.1836 0.1086 0.0814 0.0826 0.0785 0.1081 0.0808 
Marginal Effects 0.0366 -0.0376 0.0642 -0.0240 0.0702 0.0406 -0.0461 0.0248 0.0592 0.0401 
This table summarises the relationship between firm actions and credit watch outcome for short and long credit watches separately:  
 
Logit (=1 Confirmed; =0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Firm Actions + β2 RATING + β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE + β6 SGA + β7 SIZE + β8 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed, 0 = downgraded). Firm Actions relate to each of the earnings management variables. We control for the initial credit rating, length of the credit 
watch period and firm characteristics prior to the credit watch and the macro-economic environment. To control for industry effects, we employ the sectors of the “12 Industry Portfolios” of Fama and French, from which we exclude 
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the financial sector. We calculate White standard errors with firm level clustering. We present marginal effects of Firm Actions by holding other variables at their mean value and calculating the change in the probability of a rating 
confirmation when the test variable is increased by one standard deviation. z-values are given in brackets and ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Supplementary Table 4 
Earnings Management in the Presence of Target Rating (N=865) 
Panel A: Target Rating Via Ordered Probit Model 
Dependant Variable: RATING 
Explanatory Variables (1) Our Model 
(2) Alissa et al. 
(Table 1, page 133) 
(3) Hovakimian et al. 
(Table 4, page 38) 
MTB 0.3042*** 0.1071*** 0.204*** 
 (24.10) (5.16) (7.9) 
TANG 0.6042*** 0.8492*** 0.595*** 
 (13.09) (7.43) (4.2) 
RD -0.1873 0.0090 -0.989** 
 (-0.62) (1.14) (-2.2) 
RDIND 0.2145*** 0.2506*** 0.234*** 
 (10.92) (5.03) (4.3) 
SGA 0.7274*** 0.2912*** 1.117*** 
 (8.53) (2.92) (5.1) 
PROFIT 3.0082*** 3.0838*** 3.362*** 
 (27.91) (17.72) (15.6) 
SIZE 0.5111*** 0.4108*** 0.365*** 
 (83.78) (24.65) (9.2) 
OPRISK -4.9051*** -3.2372*** -5.485*** 
 (-28.03) (-11.36) (-13.3) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes  
Observations 19,176 23,909 14,364 
LR χ2 14,191.15 12,013.93 - 
Log Likelihood -44,756.70 - -49,724.0 
Pseudo-R2 0.1368 0.1170 - 
This table presents the coefficients of an ordered probit model designed to estimate the target rating of each of our sample 
companies in each of our sample years, 1989 through 2011. The method follows Hovakimian et al. (2009) and Alissa et al. 
(2013). The dependent variable is RATING, which is the cardinal value of S&P’s issuer credit rating (e.g. AAA=21, AA+ = 
20…. etc.). The rating is assumed to depend on the following firm characteristics: MTB is the market value of assets divided 
by total assets; TANG is the net plant, property and equipment divided by total assets; RD is the research and development 
expenses divided by sales; RDIND is indicator equal to one if the R&D expense is available in COMPUSTAT; SGA is the 
selling, general and administrative expenses divided by sales; PROFIT is the operating income before depreciation divided by 
lagged total assets; OPRISK is the standard deviation of PROFIT of the previous five years. Following Alissa et al., we control 
for industry effects by employing the sectors of the “12 Industry Portfolios” of Fama and French, from which we exclude the 
financial sector. Column (1) presents the coefficients for our sample while Columns (2) and (3) are abstracted from the 
Hovakimian and Alissa papers. z-values are given in brackets. ***, ** denote coefficients significant at a 1% and 5% level. 
 
 
 
60 
 
Panel B: Earnings Management in the Presence of Target Rating 
Estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Earnings Management      
Adj_ABACC 5.3443**     
 (2.09)     
Adj_ABCFO  -5.3387**    
  (-1.97)    
Adj_ABPROD   4.8714***   
   (2.58)   
Adj_ABEXP    1.6881  
    (0.61)  
Adj_REM1     3.8875*** 
     (2.78) 
Recovery Control      
TARGET 0.5799*** 0.5617*** 0.5572*** 0.4622* 0.5551*** 
 (3.24) (3.16) (3.12) (1.72) (3.11) 
RATING -0.1735*** -0.1773*** -0.1784*** -0.2766*** -0.1748*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.26) (-4.29) (-4.33) (-4.18) 
LENGTH 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0003 0.0007 
 (1.29) (1.22) (1.29) (0.44) (1.26) 
INTCOVER 0.0348** 0.0351** 0.0385*** 0.0138 0.0363*** 
 (2.52) (2.54) (2.74) (0.97) (2.61) 
PPE 0.1056 0.1338 0.2780 1.9658** 0.3011 
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.57) (2.29) (0.62) 
SGA -1.3536** -1.3318** -0.5742 0.0132 -0.6839 
 (-1.97) (-1.98) (-0.78) (0.01) (-0.95) 
SIZE 0.1023 0.0997 0.0956 0.3029*** 0.0929 
 (1.36) (1.32) (1.25) (2.62) (1.22) 
RECESSION -0.4898** -0.5028** -0.5034*** -0.8002** -0.5006** 
 (-2.51) (-2.53) (-2.58) (-2.53) (-2.53) 
Constant 0.1542 0.2218 0.0188 -0.9306 0.0124 
 (0.28) (0.40) (0.03) (-0.94) (0.02) 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 865 865 865 372 865 
PSEUDO R2 0.0972 0.0964 0.0983 0.1171 0.0998 
Marginal Effects TARGET target TARGET TARGET TARGET 
% Δ Pr. Recovery 0 vs. 1 12.71 12.33 12.22 10.26 12.18 
The above table presents coefficients for the following model: 
 
Logit (=1 Confirmed; =0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Firm Actions + β2TARGET + β3RATING + β4LENGTH + β5 INTCOVER + β6 
PPE + β7 SGA + β8 SIZE + β9 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies 
  
The estimations are the same as Table 4 with an additional variable representing the target rating. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating 
the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed, 0 = downgraded). TARGET = 1 if the firm’s rating at the start of the credit watch period is lower 
than or equal to its target rating. As before, Firm Actions relate to each of the earnings management variables. We control for the initial credit 
rating, length of the credit watch period and firm characteristics prior to the credit watch and the macro-economic environment. To control for 
industry effects, we employ the sectors of the “12 Industry Portfolios” of Fama and French, from which we exclude the financial sector. We 
calculate White standard errors with firm level clustering. We present marginal effects of Firm Actions by holding other variables at their 
mean value and calculating the change in the probability of a rating confirmation when the test variable is increased by one standard deviation. 
z-values are given in brackets and ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Supplementary Table 5 
Abnormal Production Expenses & Credit Watch Outcome: Manufacturing Versus 
Other Sectors 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
 Other Sectors 
Manufacturing 
Sector 
Comparison: 
Manufacturing 
versus Other 
Sectors 
Adj_ABPROD Mean 0.22% 0.61% 
-0.39% 
(-1.14) 
Adj_ABPROD Median -0.23% 0.26% 
-0.49%* 
(-1.67) 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
Earnings Management    
Adj_ABPROD 4.7000** 7.7612**  
 (2.33) (2.06)  
Recovery Control    
RATING -0.1695*** -0.4642***  
 (-5.99) (-5.41)  
LENGTH 0.0011*** -0.0005  
 (3.30) (-0.94)  
INTCOVER 0.0245** 0.0854***  
 (2.20) (3.20)  
PPE 0.7798*** -1.3644  
 (2.73) (-1.17)  
SGA -1.3344** -1.3966  
 (-2.16) (-0.78)  
SIZE 0.1735*** 0.4629***  
 (3.03) (3.20)  
RECESSION -0.4862*** -0.8612**  
 (-2.58) (-2.09)  
Constant -0.0372 2.0649**  
 (-0.10) (2.10)  
Sector Dummy No No  
N 1005 224  
PSEUDO R2 0.0609 0.1757  
Marginal Effects 
% Δ Pr. Recovery for 1 SD increase 
in Adj_ABPROD 
4.98 7.91  
Panel A of this table presents the mean and median difference test of abnormal production costs of manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sectors with t-tests used for mean values and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for median values. c, **, a indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
Panel B of this table presents the regression coefficients for the following model: 
Logit (=1 Confirmed; =0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Adj_ABPROD + β2 RATING + β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE + β6 
SGA + β7 SIZE + β8 RECESSION  
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed, 0 = downgraded). Adj_ABPROD is the performance-
adjusted abnormal production costs. We control for the initial credit rating, length of the credit watch period and firm characteristics prior to 
the credit watch and the macro-economic environment. To control for industry effects, we employ the sectors of the “12 Industry Portfolios” 
of Fama and French, from which we exclude the financial sector. We calculate White standard errors with firm level clustering. We present 
marginal effects of Firm Actions by holding other variables at their mean value and calculating the change in the probability of a rating 
confirmation when the test variable is increased by one standard deviation. z-values are given in brackets and ***, **, * indicate a significance 
level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Supplementary Table 6 
 The Impact of a Moody’s Credit Watch. 
 
Modified Table 3   
 Panel A: Mean Comparison 
Firm Actions 
Sample 
Size 
N 
with 
Data 
Pre 
and 
Post  
Credit 
Rating 
Outcome 
Pre- 
Credit 
Watch 
During 
Credit 
Watch 
Post- 
Credit 
Watch 
Comparison: 
during 
versus 
Pre 
Comparison: 
during 
versus 
Post 
Earnings Management        
Adj_ABACC 439 326 Confirmed 
–0.20% 
(–1.43) 
0.63%*** 
(3.79) 
–0.14% 
(–1.00) 
0.83%*** 
(3.64) 
0.77%*** 
(3.49) 
 690 531 Downgraded 
0.17% 
(1.51) 
–0.11% 
(–0.84) 
0.11% 
(0.88) 
–0.28% 
(–1.53) 
–0.22% 
(–1.24) 
Adj_ABCFO 439 395 Confirmed 
0.48%*** 
(4.15) 
0.09% 
(0.57) 
0.60%*** 
(5.28) 
–0.39%** 
(–2.31) 
–0.51%*** 
(–2.89) 
 690 650 Downgraded 
0.09% 
(0.89) 
0.68%*** 
(6.34) 
0.54%*** 
(5.65) 
0.59%*** 
(4.57) 
0.14% 
(0.96) 
Adj_ABPROD 439 400 Confirmed 
0.52%*** 
(2.83) 
0.97%*** 
(4.26) 
0.34%* 
(1.94) 
0.45%** 
(2.55) 
0.63%*** 
(3.39) 
 690 634 Downgraded 
0.02% 
(0.13) 
–0.20% 
(–1.17) 
–0.06% 
(–0.45) 
–0.22% 
(–1.64) 
–0.14% 
(–0.94) 
Adj_ABEXP 156 99 Confirmed 
–2.82%*** 
(–8.26) 
–3.12%*** 
(–5.17) 
–2.66%*** 
(–7.81) 
–0.30% 
(–0.52) 
–0.46% 
(–0.80) 
 262 183 Downgraded 
–2.26%*** 
(–7.58) 
–2.82%*** 
(–8.23) 
–2.32%*** 
(–8.02) 
–0.56%** 
(–2.27) 
–0.50%** 
(–2.03) 
Adj_REM1 439 373 Confirmed 
0.03% 
(0.13) 
0.77%** 
(2.33) 
–0.25% 
(–0.99) 
0.74%** 
(2.45) 
1.02%*** 
(3.44) 
 690 622 Downgraded 
–0.06% 
(–0.29) 
–0.90%*** 
(–3.93) 
–0.62%*** 
(–3.16) 
–0.84%*** 
(–3.75) 
–0.28% 
(–1.19) 
 Panel B: Median Comparison 
Firm Actions 
Sample 
Size 
N 
with 
Data 
Pre 
and 
Post  
Credit 
Rating 
Outcome 
Pre- 
Credit 
Watch 
During 
Credit 
Watch 
Post- 
Credit 
Watch 
Comparison: 
during 
versus 
Pre 
Comparison: 
during 
versus 
Post 
Earnings Management        
Adj_ABACC 439 326 Confirmed 
–0.03% 
(–1.15) 
0.46%*** 
(4.31) 
–0.15% 
(–1.38) 
0.52%*** 
(3.58) 
0.49%*** 
(3.79) 
 690 531 Downgraded 
0.12% 
(1.38) 
–0.13% 
(–0.83) 
0.06% 
(–0.66) 
–0.10% 
(–1.21) 
–0.13% 
(–0.72) 
Adj_ABCFO 439 395 Confirmed 
0.42%*** 
(4.65) 
0.11% 
(1.18) 
0.42%*** 
(5.24) 
–0.21%** 
(–2.17) 
–0.25%*** 
(–2.84) 
 690 650 Downgraded 
0.13% 
(1.53) 
0.56%*** 
(7.69) 
0.40%*** 
(5.43) 
0.45%*** 
(4.64) 
0.11% 
(0.92) 
Adj_ABPROD 439 400 Confirmed 
–0.09% 
(–1.02) 
0.17%*** 
(2.62) 
–0.22% 
(–0.19) 
0.32%*** 
(3.05) 
0.36%*** 
(3.43) 
 690 634 Downgraded 
–0.10% 
(–1.01) 
–0.27%** 
(–2.29) 
–0.28% 
(–1.37) 
–0.09%** 
(–2.05) 
–0.13%** 
(–2.06) 
Adj_ABEXP 156 99 Confirmed 
–2.81%*** 
(–6.57) 
–2.51%*** 
(–6.31) 
–2.65%*** 
(–6.30) 
–0.03% 
(–0.45) 
–0.14% 
(–0.09) 
 262 183 Downgraded 
–2.12%*** 
(–6.82) 
–2.35%*** 
(–7.51) 
–1.88%*** 
(–7.00) 
–0.26%** 
(–2.05) 
–0.07% 
(–1.28) 
Adj_REM1 439 373 Confirmed 
–0.61% 
(–1.04) 
–0.02% 
(1.03) 
–0.57%** 
(–1.98) 
0.52%*** 
(2.61) 
0.70%*** 
(3.27) 
 690 622 Downgraded 
–0.36% 
(–1.51) 
–0.97%*** 
(–5.26) 
–0.75%*** 
(–3.69) 
–0.71%*** 
(–4.09) 
–0.33% 
(–1.55) 
Modified Table 3 shows mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) values of our key variables across confirmed and downgraded firms. We 
exclude any watches where a Moody’s credit watch is announced before that of S&P. There are 439 confirmed firms and 690 downgraded 
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firms in our modified sample. However, for a small number of firms, pre- and post-credit watch figures are not available. The above figures 
are based on firms for which we have all pre- and post-credit watch data. All values are tested for significance against 0. We also report 
differences in the key variables between (i) the credit watch period and pre-credit watch period; and (ii) the credit watch period and post-credit 
watch period, with t-tests being used for mean values, and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for median values. The pre- and post-credit watch periods 
are of equal length to the credit watch period. t-statistics and z-values are given in parentheses in Panels A and B, respectively. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Modified Table 4 
Estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Earnings Management      
Adj_ABACC 3.6477**     
 (1.76)     
Adj_ABCFO  –7.4871***    
  (–2.91)    
Adj_ABPROD   4.3787**   
   (2.33)   
Adj_ABEXP1    0.3415  
    (0.14)  
Adj_REM1     4.0620*** 
     (3.03) 
Recovery Control      
RATING 
–0.1992*** 
(–6.69) 
–0.1970*** 
(–6.51) 
–0.1993*** 
(–6.73) 
–0.2721*** 
(–4.84) 
–0.1966*** 
(–6.57) 
LENGTH 
0.0008 
(1.59) 
0.0007 
(1.48) 
0.0008 
(1.61) 
-0.0004 
(-0.67) 
0.0007 
(1.57) 
INTCOVER 0.0254** 
(2.26) 
0.0250** 
(2.24) 
0.0277** 
(2.41) 
0.0157 
(1.19) 
0.0267** 
(2.35)  
PPE 0.3283 
(0.91) 
0.4552 
(1.26) 
0.5110 
(1.39) 
1.6348** 
(2.17) 
0.5727 
(1.56)  
SGA –2.4075*** 
(–4.13) 
–2.3254*** 
(–3.98) 
–1.7459*** 
(–2.75) 
–0.7896 
(–0.78) 
–1.7506*** 
(–2.83)  
SIZE 0.1922*** 
(3.42) 
0.1876*** 
(3.28) 
0.1860*** 
(3.30) 
0.2719*** 
(2.80) 
0.1840*** 
(3.24)  
RECESSION –0.5559*** 
(–3.04) 
–0.6007* 
(–1.88) 
–0.5398*** 
(–2.96) 
–0.8536*** 
(–2.73) 
–0.5291*** 
(–2.87)  
Constant 1.0103** 
(2.43) 
0.9568** 
(2.27) 
0.8032* 
(1.88) 
0.7770 
(0.99) 
0.7569* 
(1.77)  
Sector dummy yes yes yes yes yes 
N 1,129 1,129 1,129 418 1,129 
Pseudo R2 0.0798 0.0840 0.0824 0.1144 0.0842 
Marginal Effects Adj_ABACC Adj_ABCFO Adj_ABPROD Adj_ABEXP Adj_REM 
% Δ Pr. Recovery for 1 SD increase in variable 4.29 –5.46 4.67 0.43 5.77 
Modified Table 4 shows coefficients for the following model estimated across the modified sample of 1,129 observations: 
 
Logit (= 1 Confirmed; = 0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Firm Actions + β2 RATING + β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE + β6 SGA 
+ β7 SIZE + β8 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies 
 
To arrive at the modified sample we take all credit watches in the period after Moody’s introduced credit watch announcements (the year 1992) 
and we exclude any S&P credit watch announcement preceded by a Moody’s credit watch announcement. There are 439 confirmed firms and 
690 downgraded firms in our modified sample. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed, 0 = 
downgraded). Firm Actions relate to each of the earnings management variables. We control for the initial credit rating, length of the credit 
watch period and firm characteristics prior to the credit watch and the macroeconomic environment. To control for industry effects, we employ 
the sectors of the “12 Industry Portfolios” of Fama and French (1993), from which we exclude the financial sector. We calculate White 
standard errors with firm-level clustering. We present marginal effects of Firm Actions by holding other variables at their mean value and 
calculating the change in the probability of a rating confirmation when the test variable is increased by 1 SD. z-values are given in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Supplementary Table 7 
Trade-off between Accruals-based and Real Earnings Management:  
Regression Analysis with Alternative Measure of Accruals-based Earnings Management 
 
 Panel A: 2SLS Panel B: OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stage First Second First Second First Second 
Dep Y of Each Stage AEM REM REM AEM REM AEM 
Fitted REM    0.1148  0.2575** 
    (0.90)  (2.26) 
Fitted AEM  2.3335*     
  (1.91)     
Unfitted REM      0.0760*** 
      (3.36) 
Common Control of AEM 
and REM 
      
LENGTH -0.0017** 0.0045 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0018** 
 (-2.25) (1.61) (0.72) (-1.47) (0.72) (-2.36) 
NOA -0.0067*** 0.0046 -0.0035 -0.0041 -0.0035 -0.0042 
 (-2.95) (0.46) (-0.48) (-1.13) (-0.48) (-0.93) 
OPCYCLE 0.0001*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0001*** 
 (3.46) (-2.74) (-3.62) (0.94) (-3.62) (3.24) 
ROA -0.0175 -0.0536 -0.0579* -0.0088 -0.0579* 0.0114 
 (-0.90) (-0.99) (-1.89) (-0.56) (-1.89) (0.46) 
SIZE -0.0002 -0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0013 0.0014 
 (-0.22) (-0.86) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.49) (0.88) 
BM -0.0058 0.0112 0.0048 -0.0041 0.0048 -0.0030 
 (-1.54) (0.96) (0.70) (-1.19) (0.70) (-0.71) 
Unique Control of AEM       
LITIGATION -0.0108**  -0.0245*** -0.0189** -0.0245*** -0.0109** 
 (-2.02)  (-2.74) (-2.28) (-2.74) (-2.04) 
BIGN -0.0021  -0.0142 -0.0025 -0.0142 0.0007 
 (-0.32)  (-1.31) (-0.43) (-1.31) (0.10) 
TENURE 0.0011  0.0010 0.0012 0.0010 0.0012 
 (0.39)  (0.21) (0.52) (0.21) (0.43) 
Unique Control of REM       
MSHARE -0.0122** 0.0482** 0.0200**  0.0200** -0.0169*** 
 (-2.18) (2.48) (2.12)  (2.12) (-2.76) 
Z -0.0016 0.0080** 0.0041**  0.0041** -0.0024* 
 (-1.63) (2.47) (2.35)  (2.35) (-1.73) 
MTR -0.0222 0.1055** 0.0542*  0.0542* -0.0368* 
 (-1.24) (2.01) (1.79)  (1.79) (-1.77) 
Constant 0.0084 -0.0079 -0.0126 0.0213 -0.0126 -0.0079 
 (0.43) (-0.16) (-0.37) (1.25) (-0.37) (-0.44) 
Sector and Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0999 .0.1315 0.1172 0.1431 0.1172 0.1112 
N 870 870 870 870 870 870 
Hausman Test (F) 7.54  0.22    
(p-value) (0.01)  (0.64)    
Weak Instrument Test (Partial 
F) 
1.52  6.38    
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(p-value) (0.20)  (0.00)    
Overidentification Test (χ2) 0.30  0.11    
(p-value) (0.86)  (0.94)    
In this table, we employ Adj_ABACC_IDIOSHOCK1 in place of Adj_ABACC shown in Panel B of Table 6. All other details of the estimation 
are unchanged. 
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Supplementary Table 8 
Re-estimation of Table 3 and 4 Results: Adjusted Discretionary Current Accruals. 
 
Panel A: Table 3 with Current Accruals 
Mean Comparison 
Firm Actions 
Sample 
Size 
N 
with 
data  
Credit 
Rating 
Outcome 
Pre- 
Credit 
Watch 
During 
Credit 
Watch 
Post- 
Credit 
Watch 
Comparison: 
During versus 
Pre 
Comparison: 
During versus 
Post 
Earnings 
Management 
        
Adj_ABACC_Current 447 436 Confirmed 
-0.10% 
(-1.10) 
0.27%*** 
(2.99) 
-0.20%** 
(-2.25) 
0.37%*** 
(2.66) 
0.47%*** 
(3.58) 
 712 691 Downgraded 
-0.01% 
(-0.11) 
-0.22%*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.20%** 
(-2.50) 
-0.21%* 
(-1.82) 
-0.02% 
(-0.13) 
Median Comparison 
Firm Actions 
Sample 
Size 
N 
with 
data  
Credit 
Rating 
Outcome 
Pre- 
Credit 
Watch 
During 
Credit 
Watch 
Post- 
Credit 
Watch 
Comparison: 
During versus 
Pre 
Comparison: 
During versus 
Post 
Earnings 
Management 
        
Adj_ABACC_Current 447 436 Confirmed 
-0.09% 
          (-
1.22) 
0.16%*** 
(2.76) 
-
0.25%*** 
(-3.45) 
0.25%*** 
(2.65) 
0.28%*** 
(3.74) 
 712 691 Downgraded 
-0.12% 
(-1.22) 
-0.19%** 
(-2.49) 
-
0.16%*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.04% 
(-0.94) 
-0.05% 
(-0.13) 
 
Panel B: Table 4 with Current Accruals 
Earnings Management  
Adj_ABACC_Current 10.7175*** 
 (3.37) 
% Δ Pr. Recovery for 1 SD increase 
in variable 
0.0518 
 
In this table, we repeat the analyses of Tables 3 and 4 employing current accruals. Current accruals for each firm for each quarter is the change 
in non-cash current assets less the change in current liabilities plus the change in debt in current liabilities (∆ Compustat 40 - ∆ Compustat 36 
- ∆ Compustat 49 + ∆ Compustat 45).  We remove PPEGT from Equations 7 and 8 and add the trade receivables adjustment of Teoh et al. 
(1998) and Caton et al. (2011) to Equation 8, given trade receivables are a larger proportion of current accruals. We otherwise follow the 
method for total accruals to arrive at Adj_ABACC_Current, discretionary current accruals of the firm minus the average discretionary current 
accruals of the industry/ROA/quarter matched portfolio. The sample size is slightly reduced due to the availability of trade receivables data. 
 
Panel A repeats the analysis shown in Table 3 and shows the mean and median value of Adj_ABACC_Current across confirmed and 
downgraded firms. There are 471 confirmed firms and 758 downgraded firms in our sample, however for a small number of firms pre- and 
post-credit watch figures are not available. The above figures are based on firms for which we have all pre- and post-credit watch data. The 
values are tested for significance against zero. We also report differences of the key variables between (i) the credit watch period and pre-
credit watch period and (ii) the credit watch period and post-credit watch period, with t-tests used for mean values and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests for median values. The pre- and post-credit watch periods are of equal length to the credit watch period. t-statistics (z-values) are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 Panel B presents the coefficient for β1 in relation to the following estimation, which repeats the analysis in Table 4: 
 
Logit (=1 Confirmed; =0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Adj_ABACC_Current + β2 RATING + β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE + 
β6 SGA + β7 SIZE + β8 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed while 0 = downgraded). Adj_ABACC_Current relates 
to abnormal current accruals, as defined for Panel A. All other variables are as set out for Table 4. We present marginal effects of 
Adj_ABACC_Current by holding other variables at their mean value and calculating the change in the probability of a rating confirmation 
when this variable is increased by one standard deviation. z-values are given in brackets and ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2.  
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Supplementary Table 9 
Re-estimation of Table 4 Results: Last Accounts before Start of Watch to Last Accounts 
before the End. 
Estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Earnings Management      
Adj_ABACC 5.0423**     
 (2.32)     
Adj_ABCFO  -8.0586***    
  (-2.99)    
Adj_ABPROD   4.7347**   
   (2.45)   
Adj_ABEXP    0.8962  
    (0.38)  
Adj_REM1     4.4259*** 
     (3.17) 
Recovery Control      
RATING -0.1975*** -0.1953*** -0.1998*** -0.2498*** 
-
0.1966*** 
 (-6.86) (-6.71) (-6.98) (-4.81) (-6.81) 
LENGTH 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0002 0.0007** 
 (2.14) (1.99) (2.09) (0.41) (2.05) 
INTCOVER 0.0278** 0.0272** 0.0300*** 0.0131 0.0288** 
 (2.45) (2.41) (2.61) (1.05) (2.51) 
PPE 0.3934 0.4460 0.5602 1.6088** 0.5941* 
 (1.12) (1.27) (1.56) (2.28) (1.66) 
SGA -2.4229*** -2.4195*** -1.7716*** -1.2383 
-
1.7745*** 
 (-4.18) (-4.20) (-2.79) (-1.27) (-2.89) 
SIZE 0.1881*** 0.1870*** 0.1864*** 0.2484*** 0.1848*** 
 (3.41) (3.34) (3.37) (2.67) (3.32) 
RECESSION -0.5661*** -0.5561*** -0.5637*** -0.7623*** 
-
0.5564*** 
 (-3.31) (-3.19) (-3.28) (-2.69) (-3.21) 
Constant 0.9219** 0.9152** 0.7266* 0.6573 0.6962* 
 (2.28) (2.25) (1.77) (0.87) (1.69) 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1229 1229 1229 453 1229 
PSEUDO R2 0.0806 0.0823 0.0816 0.1058 0.0842 
Marginal Effects Adj_ABACC Adj_ABCFO Adj_ABPROD Adj_ABEXP Adj_REM 
% Δ Pr. Recovery for 1 SD increase in variable 3.69 -4.46 4.66 1.06 5.58 
This table presents coefficients for the following model: 
 
Logit (=1 Confirmed; =0 Downgraded) = Constant + β1 Firm Actions + β2 RATING + β3 LENGTH + β4 INTCOVER + β5 PPE + β6 SGA 
+ β7 SIZE + β8 RECESSION + βn Sector Dummies 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the credit watch outcome (1 = confirmed while 0 = downgraded). Firm Actions relate to each 
of the earnings management variables. In this model, we measure Firm Actions from the last quarter before the beginning of credit watch to 
the last quarter before the end of credit watch. As before, we control for the initial credit rating, length of the credit watch period and firm 
characteristics prior to the credit watch and the macro-economic environment. To control for industry effects, we employ the sectors of the 
“12 Industry Portfolios” of Fama and French, from which we exclude the financial sector. We calculate White standard errors with firm level 
clustering. We present marginal effects of Firm Actions by holding other variables at their mean value and calculating the change in the 
probability of a rating confirmation when the test variable is increased by one standard deviation. z-values are given in brackets and ***, **, * 
indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
 
 
